CIA Reading Room
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“Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP75B0038OR000200100018-4 JOURNAL OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL Tuesday - 23 October 1973 25X1 25X1 25X1A 25X1 1. Checked with Jack Ticer, Senate Armed Services Committee stall, about the matter of a briefing of Frank Sullivan, of the Committee staff, on Soviet general forces and Soviet and Chinese nuclear programs. ,I reminded Ticer that we were awaiting word from him that Sullivan's top secret security clearance had been reinstituted through the Department of Defense before proceeding to grant him compartmented clear- ances and provide him with the briefing. Ticer recalled our prior conversation on this subject and assured me he would let me know when they have final word from DOD. 2. orothy Fosdick, Senator Jackson's Permanent Subcommi _b _ __ J_aff, called to say that Senator Jackson wanted Richard Perle and her to get a briefing on the "cease fire line" in the Middle East. I told her it was my impression there was no cease fire line as such but I would check and be back in touch with her. Later in the day, after conversations wit and Mr. Maury on the subject, I told Fosdick and Perle that indeed there were no clearly defined "cease fire lines" or clear lines establishing relative positions of the Arabs and Israelis. Perle asked what kind of a map Kissinger, State, had before his discussion in Moscow and I told him I had no idea. I went on to say that with respect to Kissinger's maps, he might want to check with the State Department or, as Maury had suggested to Senator Jackson the other day, they might want to contact the Department of Defense to see if they had any more specific information on the relative position of the Arab/Israeli forces. Perle's only comment was that he would go back to Senator Jackson and perhaps check with the "military people. " 3. 1 1 In response to a call from Scott Cohen, Executive Asrisrar rto iaioz harles Percy (R., Ill. ), Mr. Maury and I talked with him about the situation in the Middle East and Maury briefed him on the scale of military activities of both the Egyptian and Syrian forces using the latest situation reports and the prepared statement which the Director used before the House Armed Services Committee this morning. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-1 5-3 80R00020010001 RC, 7/3/2003”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp75b00380r000200100018-4: JOURNAL OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Synopsis
“pproved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R00 Chief, Information Systems Analysis Staff 2E 42 Has OGC has the action responsibility, but the DD/M~S would appreciate it if you would keep us posted on developments, particularly if the position is taken that the Agency should release the quarterly reports: Att: DD/MES 74-2407 Executive officer to the DD FMS T 7D 26 Hqs 1 Jul 74 T EO-DD/M$S:Okmg (1 Jul 74) Distribution: File Orig RS Adse w/0 of Att - DD/M&S Subject w/cy of Att 1 - DD/M&S Chrono DD/M&S 74-2407: Ltr dtd 24 Jun 74 to DCI fr Edmund S. Muskie re workings of EO 11652 and the security classification system Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-0078OR006100110020-3 Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-0078fRnna1 nnh 10 SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET ACTION I i DIRECT REPLY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP DATE TIALS ~/ 7 CONCURRENCE INFORMATION I SIGNATURE APPROVAL I I DISPATCH 0~-' ~ml ~~ FORM NO. 23 / Use previous editions 1-67 J FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE R00 6 OO2 EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT Routing Slip Executive Secretary pproLed For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-00780R006100110020-3 ACTION INFO DATE INITIAL 1 DCI 2 DDCI 3 S/MC 4 DDS&T 5 DDI 6 DDM&S y-: 7 DDO 8 D/DCI/IC 9 D/DCI/NIO 10 OGC 11 OLC 12 IG 13 Compt 14 D/Pers 15 D/S 16 DTR 17 Asst/ DCI 18 AO/DCI 19 20 21 22 177;"&S 7'/- 2;i :, ,{~ [ SAM J. ERVIN. Appr.owedAFor Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-0078OR00610011 QU04J ' , E LL A K L N. AR . CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL. 10- aa:._ Hc`.!~V^! ',. JACKSON. WASH. JACO3 K. JAVITS, N.Y. LIDMJND S. MUSKIE, M.\INE EDWARD J. GURNEY, F' A. AURA-'AM RI3ICCFF, CONN. WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR.. DEL. LEE M-TCALF, MONT. BILL BROCK, TENN. JAMES 9. ALLEN, ALA. LA'.VTO `, CHILES, FLA. SAM Y.UNN, GA. WALT ER D. HJODLESTON. KY. SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C. EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA. LEE METCALF. MONT. WILLIAM V. ROTH. JR., 0',L_ JOHN L. MCCLELLAN. ARK. BILL BROCK. TENN. LAWTON CHILES. FLA. ROBERT BLAND SMITH. JR. CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (PURSUANT TO SEC. 5, S. RES. 241, 11D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION) WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 June 24, 1974 Honorable William E. Colby Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505 Dear Mr. Colby: ALVIN FROM. STAFF DIRECTOR 357 R'JSSELL BUILDING (202) 225-0773 The Subcommittee on intergovernmental Relations has completed its first set of oversight hearings on the workings of Executive Order 11652 and the security classi- fication system. I want to take this occasion to express my appreciation to you and the Central Intelligence Agency for the full cooperation the subcommittee received in con- ducting its inquiry from General Counsel John Warner and his staff. His testimony of May 29 reflected the attention given to classification problems throughout the Agency and the amount of hard work going into the effort to reform ingrained attitudes toward security and public information. It is my intention to continue and extend these oversight hearings this year and next, and I would like very much to solicit your further assistance in the study. Specifically, I would appreciate it if the Agency could forward to the subcommittee on a regular basis the four quarterly reports on authorized classifiers, classifica- tion abuses, unauthorized disclosures, and mandatory review requests and the quarterly siLmmary report it transmits to the Interagency Classification Review Committee. Please feel free to delete from those reports any classified -- material or any identification of specific individuals you feel would be inappropriate for the public record. In general, I hope the subcommittee staff will enjoy in-the future the same kind of cooperation in this Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-0078OR006100110020-3 Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-0078OR006100110020-3 William E. Colby June 2k, 1974 Page Two area it has so far received from the Agency. And, of course, I look forward to further evidence of progress in the Agency in implementing the programs and outlook on classification which Mr. Warner so well described. help. Thank you very much for your past and future Edmund S. MIuskie Approved For Release 2003/04/29 : CIA-RDP84-0078OR006100110020-3”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp84-00780r006100110020-3: NOTES TO CHIEF, INFORMATION SYSTEMS ANALYSIS STAFF FROM LJD
Synopsis
“'PYRGHT . Q Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP75-000 Frurct /~ aJ Othor Pe ca (laps Pags .SYRACUSE, N.Y. HERALD-JOUR;:AL E-132,647 HERALD-A'~ERICAN ExCA agent 0 I'to no LIS I CPYRGHT By PETER BERNSTEIN Of Our Washington Bureau Johnson's-hot commission Fri- day selected a former officer of the Central Intelligence Agency .to find out'whether recent city riots were planned. He is ~14ilanCarl _Misk ky, now a Treasury Department on the CIA's er - ica e o erit in 1962 and Medal of Meri n 1964, will have the title. "di ?ector of investigations for th ational Advisory Commissio n Civil Disorders." It was re orted that his job will,be to su ervise the commission's inves igation - under way since lat my - and coordinate the prob 'th information being gathere h e Justice Department an lawyer, who was with the Y t from 1951 to 1964, first as .an in. late and local p o I i c :tellig'ence officer. and later as assistant general counsel. i Commission Chairman Otto i{erner announced the selection of Miskovsky at a White House press conference and said the former CIA agent would oversee "independent inquiries" to ?de- termine whether a conspiracy was involved in riots that tore through a - score 'of' cities this summer., Officially, Miskovsky, who In announcing the appoint ent, Kerner, -the, governor o llinois, said it "seems logical' hat there was a conspiracy be ind the riots. But he said th ommission has yet W find an\ erner did not mention it, hut t stimony last month before th CPYRGHT conspiracy to foment riots. I Kernor said the 11-member, kestimony from 75 witnesses, in-i L,1..4,;.. ?t,,. ,,,Dune nr Nnurnrk' and Detroit -- cities hardest hit, by this year's riots - would de-, liver Its interim report to Presi ent Johnson "as soon as possi? le" with recommendations for, immediate help" to thwart fur her civil disorders. ' { Rather than recommend newl egislation, the commission in? is interim report probably will` all - for "short-range' assist- nee to low-income areas from: uch sources as private industry nd universities which are locat?; d within the cities, Kerner; .i saying that most of the recent iolence . began with . rock-1 ears olds Kerner said that uni;i ouraging students -to tutor po- Not until the psychic pattern f inferiority among ghetto egroes is eradicated, will the ties be tree or the threat of ore civil, disorders, Kerner accompanied at the White House news conference .by Mayor John Lindsay of New York City, who is vice-chairman of the commis- nor Lindsay, a Republican, r ferred to' urban legislation no Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200340008-1”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp75-00001r000200340008-1: EX-CIA AGENT TO PROBE RIOTS
Synopsis
“Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200106b0 SECURITY INFOR INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM SOCIALIZATION OF CHINESE AGRICULTURE/ CIA/RR IM-370 24 November 1952 WARNING THIS MAITERIAL CONTAINS 'ORMA.TIOTNN AFFECTING WIT1nN NG THE THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAW, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 791+, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reports Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 CIA/RR IM-370 SECURITY I SOCIALIZATION OF CHINESE AGRICULTURE Sm maxy The land reform program initiated in Communist China in 1947 aims at the complete socialization of Chinese agriculture. In its initial stages, land reform in Communist China has followed, with some mod- ifications, the pattern established by the USSR, in particular as it has been applied in the European Satellites. First, the great land- lords and even the more well-to-do peasants are dispossessed, and their holdings are distributed among the landless and land-poor peasants. Then follows the fostering of various types of cooperatives, all within the aura of intensive propaganda aimed toward the complete socialization of agriculture. The process is proceeding in Communist China more rapidly than was anticipated. By the spring of 1952, land had been redistributed to about 300 million peasants (including mem- bers of their households). So far, it appears that agricultural production in Communist China has not been measurably affected as a result of the land distribution, although it is still too early to evaluate with any degree of certainty the effects on agricultural production. 1. Redistribution of Land. The Chinese Communist program of land reform was initiated under the Agrarian Law of September 1947.,1/* This law abolished owner- ship rights in land and provided for the confiscation of land and means of production belonging to "landlords and kulaks" and the trans- fer of this property to landless and land-poor peasants as private property. Land confiscation followed the "liberation" of new ter- ritories by the Chinese Communist armies, generally in a geographic pattern beginning in the Northeast (Manchuria) and North China -- so-called old liberated areas -- through the East, Central-South, and Southwest regions of China. * Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in the Appendix. Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 During the period between "liberation" and land redistribution a rent reduction program. was carried out. Instructions were given to create within 1 to 2 years the necessary conditions for land. reform; that is, a stabilized situation including the evacuation of all Nationalist troops, a demand from the majority of peasants for con- fiscation and redistribution, and enough agrarian reform workers guiding the movement to assure success. At the same time, steps were to be taken to prevent a falling off in agricultural production. Thus the actual work of land distribution was usually carried out after the fall harvests and relaxed at spring planting time. According to the official plan, land was to be distributed progres- sively over a series of years, so that by the spring of 1952 the first stages of land reform would have been completed and specified numbers of the rural population would have been benefited, on the following schedule _!? by the spring of 1949, 100 million people; by the spring of 1950, 157 million; by the spring of 1951, 285 million; and by the spring of 1952, 385 million. Certain districts have been excluded from this schedule: Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, the Northwest, and Tibet. Because of the indigenous customs pertaining to land tenure among the minority ethnic groups living in these districts, a different technique to be described later is being applied. Members of peasant households in Honan received from 2 to 3 mou (0.13 to 0.2 hectare) of land per capita, and in Hunan and Hupeh the allotments of land ranged from 1 to 2.5 mou (0.06 to 0.17 hectare). ! By the spring of 1952, about 300 million peasants, including mem- bers of their households, had received land benefits, and it is the expectation that land distribution will have been completed by the end of 1952. J As a rule, certificates of proprietorship have been issued to peasants receiving land. 5/ As a means of checking the progress of their program, the Communist hierarchy sent out inspection teams in the early part of 1952 to deter- mine irregularities and report cases in which the land reform had not been successful. Persons accused of being deviationists were very often subjected to violence. It is, in fact, estimated that at least 1.5 million people have been executed and that perhaps 35 million to 45 million have been stigmatized as "exploiters" and have been. pauperized and maltreated in varying degrees. 61 It is possible that this pro- cedure has been used as a tool to create a "labor force" for use on government projects such as the Huai Ho water conservancy project. Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21.: CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S-E-C-R-E-T 2. Role of the Comunist Party in the Redistribution of Land. Con:i.st Party has rigidly controlled the redistribution of land inChina through directives to Party cadres, who are trained and then sent to the villages to organize work teams to effect the con- fiscation of land, to classify the inhabitants (that is, as landloi&s, middle peasants, and poor peasants), and actually to distribute the land. Furthermore, following the distribution of the land, the cadres engage in completely reorganizing rural life. By indoctrination and training they are attempting to gain control of the people at the grass-roots level, especially in old "liberated" areas like North China and the Northeast. 3. Further Steps in Chinese Communist Agrarian Policy. The Chinese Communists do not intend that the land redistribution is to be an end in itself. It is only-the first stage in their agrar- ian policy. Land redistribution was almost immediately followed by a second stage inaugurated by the organization of so-called Mutual Aid Teams. The programs set up for these Mutual Aid Teams have been of four general types: (a) The first type is the interchange of labor at seeding time in spring. (b) The second type is the interchange of labor during each of the three busy seasons of planting, cultivating, and harvesting. In this program, the winter season, when supplemental income is earned, is not included. (c) The third type is the estab- lishment of a year-round labor pool in which implements and animals sometimes are awned Jointly, and sometimes working capital is also pooled. (d) The fourth type is the cooperative farming of the land, with all operations of`planting, cultivating, and harvesting performed on. a partnership basis, production being divided according to inputs. This fourth type still excludes the winter supplemental work. 7 It has been officially announced that 80 percent of farm households in Manchuria and 55 percent in North China have been organized into Mutual Aid Teams of one or another of these four general types, Statistics are incomplete for the rest of China, but percentages of organization are undoubtedly lower than in the North and Northeast, where Communist control is not so firm. The 19-52 plan for North. China is to organize 70 to 80 percent of all peasants into cooperatives and other types of Mutual Aid Teams. The next stage of the agrarian reform is the organization of the Agricultural Producer Cooperative, in which all boundaries of house- .hold lands are eradicated and in which there is a complete division of activities among labor groups. The government encourages the S -E -C -R -E -T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S-E-C-R-E-T evolution of the four types of Mutual Aid Teams into the Agricultural Producer Cooperative type. The shares of each member in the profits are governed by the individual's inputs of land, labor, and capital. In an April speech, Kao Kang, chairman of the Northeast China People's Government, stated that there are now more than 1,200 Agricultural Producer Cooperatives in the Northeast.* At the same time that Agricultural Producer Cooperatives are being encouraged by the government, state farms are being organized in increasing numbers. There are 52 relatively large state farms in various localities, 10 including 20 large mechanized farms in Man- churia. 11 The latter have been in existence since the Japanese occupation and were taken over by the Communist government'in 1948. The purpose of the large farms in Manchuria is to train cadres of young Communists. in modern mechanized farming methods and at the same time to indoctrinate them with the "political ideology" which is thought to be correlated with the idea of collective farming. Wheat and soy- beans are mostly grown on these farms. The goal is to establish a state farm at regional, provincial, county, and subcounty levels, to serve as a model for Mutual Aid Teams and Agricultural Producer Cooperatives. Nationalization of the land has not entered into the Chinese pic- ture as yet. The Chinese Communists are convinced, however, that agriculture must be collectivized if China is to acquire the capital and labor it needs for industrialization. 4. Evaluation of Chinese Communist Agrarian Policy. There are many indications that the Chinese Communists are in a general way following in the path of Communists in the USSR and the European Satellites, benefiting perhaps in some instances by their experiences and mistakes. As in the USSR, the first principle of action has been the abolition of private ownership of land "in order to free the rural productive forces, develop agricultural production, and thus pave the way for New China's industrialization." 12/ By this means the regime will gain control of agricultural production. Like the USSR, China needs agricultural commodities to barter for industrial goods. * Kao Kang further stated that the Northeast would be fully mechanized within 5 or 6 years. 9/ Before the Japanese war, 80 percent of the total value of China's exports cam from agricultural commodities. - 4 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S E-C-R-E-T The genuine grievances of the Chinese peasants have been skillfully utilized by the Chinese Communists in their struggle for political power, agrarian reform being made an effective political instrument. Consequently, one characteristic of the land policy of the Chinese Communists is its synchronization with political expediency. Certainly it can be expected that the regime became popular to a degree, having given the "land to the tillers," 12 which was the promise of Sun Yat Sen. What has actually followed as an immediate after-effect is a matter of conjecture. There have been reports 13 that the taxes exacted by the Communists are higher than total taxes under the old government -- the announced rate is no higher than 37 percent of all crops produced -- but some reports indicate that it is often as high as 50 to 70 percent. When the 1952 wheat harvest turned out to be better than average, the government immediately announced a higher collection rate. In addition to taxes, farmers are induced to make "voluntary" contributions to "victory bonds" and to "arms for Korea." Since dune 1950, Chinese Communist tactics have been to encourage a "rich" peasant economy. By efforts to induce peasants to work with- out fear that their produce would be requisitioned, the government hopes to stimulate production. "Rich" peasants are encouraged because their land and means of production are generally superior and because their productivity is therefore higher than the average. At the same time, the government has taken steps to minimize resistance to its policies. As in all primitive countries, Chinese peasant farmers are wedded to the principle of private property and do not understand the "advantage" to be gained from nationalization. Another aspect of the Chinese Communist agricultural policy is that great stress has been placed on endouraging the peasants to organize voluntarily, a process which may permit China to avoid the disruption that followed the forced collectivization of land in the USSR in the early 19301s. According to one report, 25X1 X7 Kao Kang said 15/: "Cooperatives in such manner that is, forcibly organize d3 will produce very poor results and will leave a bad impression upon the people, adding dif- ficulties to the future development of Agricultural Producer Cooperatives." - 5 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S-E-C-R-E-T Propaganda, political pressure, and economic inducements are combined to convince peasants of the "advantages" of Mutual Aid Teams and Agri- cultural Producer Cooperatives. For instance, farm equipment supply stations, fertilizer cooperatives, and so on, give priority of supply to Mutual Aid Teams and Agricultural Producer Cooperatives. In the Northwest and some other areas where there are ethnic minor- ities, the implementation of the land reform differs from that carried out in areas populated by Chinese. Chinese Communist officials have even stated 161: "Before land reform can be carried out well, it must be demanded by the local minority nationality masses, concurred in by the leading personages, directed by localities, and its method of implementation planned in complete conformity with local conditions. "There will be no expropriation of land owned by Mohammedan mosques and Tibetan monasteries for distribu- tion. These lands are closely related to the religious faith of the masses and they must be differentiated from the land of the landlords." In China proper the graves which, it is said, occupy 2 percent of the arable land, have so far been left intact, although many churches have been confiscated and are used for grain storage. It is perhaps too early to judge the results of the agrarian pol- icies, but it appears that agricultural production has not been meas- urably affected as a result of the land distribution. It is reported that some peasants have already become disenchanted with the regime -- with its interference in their private lives, and constant drives for donations added to the high taxes -- and have resisted through the weapon of lowered production. This result is difficult to ascertain, however, from production statistics, because of the long period of war with Japan, then civil war and disruption, and a serious drought in 1949. Among the problems which will confront the Chinese Communist govern- ment are a further subdivision of the tillable land and the practical application of mechanization. The latter cannot be accomplished with- out the consolidation of small holdings into units large enough for the economic use of modern farm machinery which is one of the reasons for the government stressing the Agricultural Producer Cooperative. - 6 - S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S-E-C-R-E-T For the Communists, the mechanization of agriculture is pre- requisite to industrialization, and in China it seems a particularly formidable problem. Agricultural implements cannot be manufactured domestically in sufficient amounts, and the more urgent need of other items precludes the importation of agricultural implements. There is no evidence of the importation of agricultural machinery in signif- icant quantities either from the USSR or from other sources. On the other hand, the estimated industrial labor force of China and Man- churia today is about 2 million as contrasted with an agricultural labor force of 200 million to 240 million. Chinese industry is unable to absorb the present surplus agricultural labor, and there would have to be a tremendous expansion in industry before the additional labor supply released by the mechanization of agriculture could possibly be absorbed. It is believed that mechanization of agriculture in China will follow the same general pattern as was followed in the USSR, and as is being followed in the European Satellites today. This pattern is to propagandize mechanization, but to defer its being put into effect until such time as industry has developed to a point where it can pro- vide the necessary farm machinery and also absorb additional manpower. In all the present Communist countries, at the time that the Communist regimes came into power, there existed a situation similar to that now obtaining in China -- a general inadequacy of industry and a large agricultural population, generally under employed. In the USSR, mechanization of agriculture was not attempted until 10 or 15 years after the Russian Revolution of 1919. The European Satellite govern- ments are only now beginning to make serious attempts to mechanize agriculture, 7 or 8 years after gaining power. How long the mechaniza- tion of agriculture will require in Communist China is difficult to foretell, but it is believed to be several years in the future. -7- S E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S-E-C-R-E-T APPENDIX SOURCES Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated "Eval.," have the following significance: A - Completely reliable B - Uusually reliable C - Fairly reliable D - Not usually reliable E - Not reliable F - Cannot be judged 1 - Confirmed by other sources 2 - Probably true 3 - Possibly true 4 - Doubtful 5 - Probably false 6 - Cannot be judged Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author does not disagree with the evaluation on the cited document. 1. People's China, Supplement to No. 2, Vol. II, 16 Jul 1950. U. Eval. RR A-1. 2. OIR Report No. 5713, 8 Nov 1951. R. Eval. RR B-3. 3. Chao Kuo-chun, "Current Agrarian Reform Policies in Communist China," reprinted from The Annals of the American Academy of Politic-1 and Social Science, Sep 1951. U. Eval. RR 1. 4+. Department of State Despatch No. 1126, Hong Kong, 5 Dec 1951. U. Eval. RR 3. The figure given in this source is 310 million. Later data, 25X1 A2g however, indicate that "areas with t-t-.1 rural population of 300 million have fulfilled land reform." FBIS, 1 Oct 1952, p. AAA 26. R. Eval. RR C-3. 25X1X7 6. OIR Report No. 5713, 8 Nov 1951, P. 5. R. Eval. RR B-1. 7. 8. OIR Report No. 5650.8, 15 Mar 1952. S. Eval. RR B-i. 9. FBIS, 21 Apr 1952. R. Eval. RR 2. -8- S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 .Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4 S-E-C-R-E-T 25X1 A2gDP79 001-4 2 1X Eval. F-2. l3. These reports include: IR-52-52, CIA 727878, 26 10. People's China, No. 19, 1 Oct 1952, p. 17. U. Eval. RR 2. 11. Interrogation of August Schill, 7 Mar 1952. S. Eval. RR F-3. 12. People's China, Supplement to No. 2, Vol. II, A2ticle 1. U. Eval _. P%.R A-i. 25X1X7A 15. FBIS, 21 Apr 1952, AAA 23. R. Eval. S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 1999/09/21 : CIA-RDP79T00935A000200170001-4”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp79t00935a000200170001-4: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM SOCIALIZATION OF CHINESE AGRICULTURE
Synopsis
“25X1C10b 61 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 FOR Y February 1971 COMMUNIST OFFICIALS ABROAD: THOSE IN TROUBLE LAST YEAR The information below has to do specifically with Communist officials serving their governments in the West who, between January 1970 and January 1971, were declared persona non grata (PNG) and expelled from the countries to which they had been assigned. A total of 31 Communist officials were PNG'd during the period. For every PNG case that is documented as public knowledge, there are countless instances of officials whose PNG cases remain unpublicized for political reasons, of officials who leave quietly before action can be taken against them, or of officials who through public exposure become identified as intelligence officers operating under the guise of commercial or other representation but against whom no action is taken. For example, during the summer 1970 trial in Bonn, West Ger- many, of confessed spy Joseph Eitzenberger, he named Ivan Semeno- vich MOSKALENKO, Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Vienna as the recipient of classified NATO and West European s,eientific information. Vienna newspaper accounts of late June said the Austrian Foreign Office had requested a report on MOSKALENKO from the Interior Ministry and that if the report should indicate that MOSKALENKO were operating against the interests of Austria, "something will be done." MOSKALENKO remained in Vienna. Similarly, in Mexico during March 1970 Soviet intelligence officers were identified by Raya KISELNIKOVA during press confer- ences held after her escape from the Soviet embassy where she had been a secretary in the Soviet Trade Mission. According to accounts in El Universal, Excelsior, and other major Mexican news- papers, KISELNIKOVA told the Mexican secret police that four members of the consular section, whose names she revealed in secret, spent only eight hours weekly on their jobs of issuing visas,: and the rest of their time in secret operations involving Mexican workers and student organizations. She publicly identified Oleg Maksimovich NECHIPORENKO, embassy Second Secretary and Chief of the Consular Section, as the "watchdog" of Soviet personnel stationed in Mexico. She also publicly identified embas- sy First Secretary Yuriy Viktorovich KUPLYAKOV as active in espio- nage work. No actions were taken against these Soviets. The Second Secretary of the Rumanian Embassy in Switzerland Ion CROITORU, left suddenly for home when he was identified as the contact of an arrested Swiss spy whose case broke last February. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 The case involved a Swiss female employee of the Zurich city administration who was charged with having supplied both Rumanian and Soviet officials with blank personal identity cards, residence permits, and other documents. A former Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy who had left Switzerland the year before, Aleksandr Fedorovich GRACHEV, was also identified as the KGB contact of the accused. Two Soviet commercial representatives were recalled to the USSR following publicity given them in the West German press during January 1970. They were Viktor BAKUNOV who represented Avtoeksport in East Germany and Vladimir Denisovich PAVLOV who was a commercial counselor in the Soviet Trade Mission in East Germany. Both BAKUNOV and PAVLOV were exposed as having tried to recruit stewardesses on international airlines flying into West Berlin to serve as couriers between Berlin and Western countries and to bring "espionage mail" and other secret material over the border without inspection. In Sweden, the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Ivan Pavlovich KISELEV, was the subject of a two-part feature story which ran in the August-September 1970 issues of the magazine Lektyr. The articles were authored by an East German, Swedish- aa sed free lance journalist whom KISELEV had previously recruited. One of the articles carried photographs of actual agent meetings between KISELEV and the journalist. KISELEV, who was assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Sweden as of July 1967, had been one of the 20 Soviet officials declared PNG and expelled from Ghana during March 1966 in the wake of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah. The names mentioned above represent a mere handful of the examples which could be cited. The listings which follow concern PNG actions taken during 1970. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A0003001404 1971 COMMUNIST OFFICIALS DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG) DURING'1970: A total 'of 31 Communist officials were countries during 1970. declared'PNG by Free World Country of Origin Type of Assignment: and Name : ALBANIA Soto SOFRONI Diplomatic CUBA Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez Diplomatic Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez Diplomatic EAST GERMANY. Siegfried BUETTNER Diplomatic HUNGARY Janos HEGEDUS Diplomatic POLAND pert BALAWENDER Diplomatic Wlodzimierz KWIATKOWSKI Diplomatic Janusz PRYSTROM Diplomatic Jan RODAK ' Diplomatic Czeslaw TANANA Diplomatic USSR LEKSANDROV, Vladimir Ivanovich BOROVINSKIY, Petr Fedorovich LEBEDEV, Sergey Mikhaylovich MAMONTOV, Yuriy Leonidovich MESROPOV, Valeriy Moiseyevich NETREBSKIY, Boris Pavlovich OREKHOV, Boris-Mikhailovich PODKILZIN, Boris RYABOV, Yuriy Ivanovich SAVICH, Boris Trofimovich Embassy employee Diplomatic Diplomatic Trade mission Commercial Nov stand'Diplomatic Pravda Diplomatic Inturis Commercial Country from w iTi' h expelled: Italy United Nations United Nations Belgium Belgium United Kingdom France United Kingdom Italy West Germany Norway Argentina Norway Netherlands United States Congo (Kinshasa) Argentina Belgium Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01 194A000300140001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 USSR (Cont.) SAVIN, Nikolay Andreyevich Diplomatic SHAROVATOV, Vladimir Semonovich Embassy employee SIMANTOVSKIY, Oleg Vladimirovich Diplomatic STERLIKOV, Aleksey Petrovich Diplomatic STUDENIKOV, Igor Diplomatic TIKHOMIROV, Aleksandr Vasilyevich Translator TUMANOV, Boris G. TASS UTKIN, Stanislav Grigoryevich Diplomatic VALYALIN, Fedor Fedorovich Diplomatic ZAMOYSKTY, Lolliy Petrovich Izvestiya ZHEGALOV, Leonid Nikolayevich Press corps Switzerland Netherlands Congo(Kinshasa) Switzerland Congo(Kinshasa) United Nations Congo(Kinshasa) Norway Congo(Kinshasa) Italy United States. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 CIA-RDP79-O1194AOOg4g9j OQjt? COMMUNIST OFFICIALS DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA (PNG) DURING 1970 (By case, within geographic areas where the action was taken.) AFRICA Congo (Kinshasa) On 16 May 1970, the Kinshasa daily Le Progres reported the ex- pulsion of four Soviets -as'the-result of the'Congo (Kinshasa) Government's discovery of a Russian spy network operating within the Congolese army, Ministry of Information, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.' The Soviet diplomats were accused of holding frequent meetings;with student elements to spread "false rumors." The press cited a reciprocal agreement made between the governments of Congo (Kinshasa) and the USSR to limit to seven the number of diplomats in the embassies of each country and noted that the USSR had upped the number of Soviets in the Kinshasa diplomatic community to 42. Kinshasa, meanwhile, had four diplomats in Moscow. The 20 May issue of La Tribune Africain identified the expellees and named three additional Soviets whose nefarious activities had been re- vealed during government investigations. The Soviet diplomats expelled were: Oleg Vladimirovich SIMANTOVSKIY, KGB official and embassy attache; Igor STUDENIKOV, KGB official and interpreter; Boris PODKILZIN, KGB official in the embassy consular office; and Fedor Fedorovich VALYALIN, long- term embassy visitor. VALYALIN first arrived in Kinshasa as an escort officer for a Soviet football team which visited the Congo in December 1969. He carried a diplomatic passport with a visi- tor's visa. When the football team left, VALYALIN stayed. He moved into the Soviet embassy and a few weeks later quietly asked for a permanent visa and a diplomatic identity card, both of which he got. The other Soviets' implicated by the article in La Tribune Africain were: Vitaliy Grigoryevich NOVIKOV, embassy Counselor and official; Ivan Ignatyevich STOVBUN, press attache and GRU official who had been previously expelled from Israel; and Boris G. TUMANOV, TASS representative. By late July, TUMANOV too had been expelled. The 6 June issue of the government- controlled newspaper, Tribune Diplomatigue, had charged that TUMANOV was in reality an officer in the Soviet GRU intelligence organization who disguised himself as a newspaperman. The article called for TUMANOV to leave the country; he ignored the suggestion. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 recc FpQ6nRR4ft@?Arr~b fQ9:s FpPoT$-q 1i QQa 40001-8 often posed as a Frenchman during his assignments as TASS man in the Congo, was formally invited to leave on 28 July. The Congo- lese Ministry of Information announced that "TUMANOV was ordered to leave the former Belgian Congo within 48 hours" and noted that "the Ministry had informed TUMANOV that the measure was taken against him personally." Following investigations of charges that East German aid officials, including some teachers, had been actively "meddling in internal affairs," the Zanzibar government announced PNG action taken against East German Counselor Siegfried BUETTNER as of mid-June 1970. Belgium On 31 March 1970, Brussels daily La Lanterne reported the arrest of Boris Trofimovich SAVICH, a Sovietyee at the joint Soviet-Belgian motor vehicle business corporation, Scaldia-Volga. SAVICH was arrested in a Brussels restaurant where he was caught attempting to get Western military data. The Belgian Justice Ministry charged SAVICH with trying to set up "a spy network in- side the NATO military nerve center in southern Belgium." SAVICH was also accused of showing undue interest in the French Mirage-5. A few days later, he was declared PNG and expelled from Belgium. In mid-December 1970, the Belgian Security Service apprehended Assistant Polish Military Attache, Lt. Col. Wlodzimierz KWIATKOWSKI, "in the act of taking possession of NATO documents," according to press reports. KWIATKOWSKI and his chauffeur, Albert BALAWENDER, were subsequently expelled. In describing the incident, The Hague's Haagsche Courant noted, 28 December, that the Polish military attac returned home "for reasons of health." AP and Reuters Paris dispatches, of 23 July 1970, revealed that a Polish diplomat, Jan RODAK, had been caught "red handed" spying and that the French Foreign Office had demanded his imme- diate recall to Warsaw. RODAK was described as Second Secretary of the Polish Embassy, posted to Paris since 26 June 1970 and apprehended on 4 July 1970. Italy On 13 February 1970, Rome's La Stampa, Il Messaggero, and other 2 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 big dailies reported PNG action taken against two Soviets earlier that month. Vladimir Ivanovich ALEKSANDROV, an employee in the Soviet Military Attache's office in Rome since mid-1968, was expelled on the charge that he had obtained military information involving the security.of Italy from an Italian Air Force sergeant. Lolliy Petro- vich ZAMOYSKIY, Izvetiva representative in Rome since March 1968, was expelled for "infringing the rule governing the residence of Soviet journalists in Italy." The Zamoyskiy case was actually in retaliation for the USSR's earlier expulsion of Ennio Caretto, Moscow correspondent for Rome's La Stampa. On 10 March 1970, the Italian Government took formal PNG action against Albanian Foto SOFRONI, embassy Second Secretary. SOFRONI had been:involved in the collection of military intelligence through an Italian Air Force soldier based at the Italian Air Base, Foggia. The Italian Security Service decided to roll up the case when the Albanian sought detailed information on Italian Air Force radio frequencies. SOFRONI was also interested in NATO strength, NATO classified documents, and U.S. Air bases in Italy. The Dutch Government, on 6 May 1970, named as spies Soviets Boris Pavlovich NETREBSKIY, who acted as both Novosti representa- tive and embassy Second Secretary, and Vladimir S emenovich SHAROVATOV, a Soviet embassy employee without diplomatic status. Stories in De Volkskrant and Algemeen Dagblad of 8-11 May said the pair had come to of icial attention after a 17 February auto accident near Schipol airfield where their Volga car ran off the road and sank in- to a canal. Both were unhurt but were unable to get their belong- ings out of the car. The Foreign Ministry announcement said police had found a map of Dutch military installations and other incrimi- nating documents in the vehicle. At the time of the announcement, SHAROVATOV was in the USSR; he was refused re-entry. NETREBSKIY was given 48 hours to leave. (See attached reprint from Algemeen Dag- blad, "Novosti: Cover for Spies.") Norway On 29 January, stories broke in the Norwegian press regarding two Soviet diplomats who had been quietly expelled during 1968 as a result of two separate unpublicized military espionage cases. The officials were Sergey Mikhaylovich LEBEDEV, embassy Third Sec- retary, and Stanislav Grigoryevich UTKIN, embassy Second Secretary. The Norwegian Defense Association had recently issued a resolution calling for greater openness on the part of the authorities with respect to matters of a military or politico-military character. The resolution also indicated that "active intelligence agents having diplomatic status had been expelled from the country." Articles in Oslo's Morgenbladet of 29 and 31 January expressed Nor- Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 wegian concern over the growing Soviet representation which totaled 80 members of the diplomatic community, and asked why the Soviets had been so quietly expelled and why the Norwegian people had not been previously informed of the cases. In mid-May 1970, a Soviet engineer who had been living in Osld since about October 1968 was declared PNG on charges of espionage. The engineer, Valeriy Moiseyevich MESROPOV, was an employee in the joint Soviet-Norwegian commercial venture, Koneisto-Norge A/S in Drammen. The Norwegian press reported 15 September that "a Soviet engineer was arrested after the authorities felt they had proof he had used his stay in Norway to recruit contacts who might be useful in illegal intelligence work." (See also the attached reprint from Morgenbladet of 22 September concerning the affairs of Koneisto- Norge and the MESROPOV case.) An espionage case in Switzerland during early 1970 resulted in the departure from that country of two Soviet officials and the identification of an additional Soviet intelligence officer. On 3 February 1970, Marcel Buttex, a Swiss official in charge of immi- gration and residence permits in Lausanne, was arrested as a Soviet spy. Buttex was responsible for supplying Soviet diplomats with large quantities of Swiss identity papers and other material that would enable Soviets to smuggle illegals using Swiss documents in- to Switzerland and other countries. The case of Marcel Buttex resulted in the expulsion from Switzerland of Soviet diplomats Nikolay Andreyevich SAVIN, Second Secretary, and of Aleksey Petrovich STERLIKOV, First Secretary. Former Second Secretary Aleksandr Fedorovich GRACHEV, who had returned to the USSR in July 1969, was also exposed for his role in the Buttex case. United Kingdom In October 1969 Polish Ambassador DOBROSIELSKI in London was called to the British Foreign Office and told that four members of his staff had been involved in "inadmissible activities" and that he should draw his own conclusions. Colonel Czeslaw TANANA, Assistant Military Attache, departed in early December 1969. When the other three Poles, Second Secretary Janusz PRYSTROM and two clerks in the Military Attach6's Office, had not left by 16 January 1970 they were ordered to leave the country. (See the attached reprint from The Daily Telegraph of 28 January 1970, concerning this case and retaliatory PNG action against British diplomats taken by the Polish government.) 4 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 West Germany On 19 December 1970, Die Welt and Bild Zeitun carried stories of an espionage case involving an un-named- oviet diplomat. At about the same time, the First Secretary of the Embassy of the USSR, Petr Fedorovich BOROVINSKIY, went home for the Christmas holidays. By 7 January 1971, the Bonn Government let it be known that BOROVINSKIY had been asked to leave the country and a Die Welt article asserted that BOROVINSKIY was a leading figure tH67Toviet intelligence service and that two West Germans who had been working with him, a Daniel Walczak and his son, had been arrested. The 20 January 1971. issue of Quick describes the Soviet diplomat as "GRU Colonel Petr Fedorovic OVINSKIY, legal resident and chief of an approximately 20-man GRU spy group in the Soviet embassy." Through his contacts with the West Germans, the article said, BOROVINSKIY had acquired infrared and other electronic gear from a West German Leopard-type tank, an ABC gas mask, NATO troop, maneuver maps, and other classified military data. WESTERN HEMISPHERE Argentina After 1 Soviets Yuriy Ivanovich RYABOV and Yuriy Leonidovich MAMENTOV were arrested on 4 November 1970, and expelled three days later, the Argentine Government issued an official statement to the effect that the two had been discovered carrying out activities "incompatible with their positions." According to articles in El Universal and other Buenos Aires papers of 6-8 November, RY arrived in Argentina in May as a representative of the Soviet travel bureau, Inturist, and MAMONTOV represented two Soviet commercial trade organizations, Medeksport and Soveksportfilm. As employees of the Soviet trade mission, neither had diplomatic immunity. Press reports at the time of their arrest said both men had been under police surveillance for several weeks and suspicion that they were KGB agents was confirmed to the government's satisfaction when, upon arrest, one was found to be carrying a metal tube which authorities said contained microfilmed data on military and industrial complexes. At the time of their arrest, RYABOV threw himself on the ground in an effort to; injure himself and thus prove mistreatment, and MAMONTOV tried to swallow a page of writing from his notebook. Janos HEGEDUS, First Secretary in the Hungarian Embassy in Ottowa was declared PNG on 7 January 1970. HEGEDUS was involved in an intelligence operation with a naturalized Canadian of Hungarian origin who fled Hungary in 1956 and was employed by a Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Canadian Government department. In retaliation, Canadian Consul S.G. Noble was PNG'd and left Budapest on 31 January 1970. United Nations In February 1970, Ale:ksandr Vasilyevich TIKHOMIROV, a Russian translator with the United Nations Secretariat since June 1965, was arrested in Seattle, Washington, and charged with conspiring with an un-named U.S. Air Force sergeant to get secret materials concerning the air defense system of the Pacific Northwest. TIKHOMIROV was declared PNG on 16 February and expelled on 17 February. The Soviets attempted to claim diplomatic immunity for TIKHOMIROV. Their claim was rejected on the basis that he was an employee of an international organization and had "functional immunity only when performing duties of an official capacity." Two members of the Cuban mission to the United Nations were asked to leave in October 1970 on charges they had used a female employee of a "friendly embassy" in Washington to collect political intelligence about the Americas. The officials were Counselor Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez and First Secretary Orlando PRENDES Gutierrez. United States In retaliatory measures, two Soviet correspondents were declared PNG by the United States in 1970. Pravda correspondent in New York, Boris Mikhaylovich OREKHOV, was-ceclared PNG on 26 June for having engaged in "non-journalistic activities." OREKHOV was also charged with having twice violated travel restric- tions. Washington press corps member, Leonid Nikolayevich ZHEGALOV, was declared PNG in November. (See the attached reprints from the 23 December 1970 Newswee concerning Moscow's actions against U.S. correspondents in the USSR.) Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 LA MEUSE-LA LANTERNE, Brussels 1 April 1970 . THE TWO SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES: The Soviet Union has two large intelligence services: the KGB, which is the state security committee, and the GRU, which is the intelligence command of the Soviet general staff. The KGB is the more powerful of the two. It is directly under the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, while the GRU comes under the Ministry of Defense. The GRU is connected with the KGB in many areas, particularly with regard to the central files, which are kept by the KGB. All intelligence is kept there, regardless of subject or origin (even if it is from the GRU). In addi- tion, the KGB has two missions: one offensive (espionage) and one defensive (counter-espionage). The GRU has only one, principally: offensive intelligence, specifically related to the military domain. The KGB carries out its defensive role even inside the army and the GRU. CPYRGHT Les deux services russes de renseignements le K.G.B. of Ic G.R. L'Unlon sovietlque dispose de deux grands services de renseignement : is K.G.B., qui est le comitf de securite de l'Etat, et le G.R.U., qui eat la direction principals du . renseignement de i'etat-ma- Jor general sovietique. Le K.G.B. cst Ic plus puissant des deux. fl depend diree- tement du Conseil des minis- tres de l'Union sovletique Is G.R.U. reieve, lul, du ministers de la Defense. 4e G.R.U. cat Ili au K.G.B. A blest des titres, notamment en cc qul concerne leg ri It i 1LIIH I. W{ IIII~I 1 ~I, archives centrales qui sont aux mains du K.G.B. Tous lee renseignementa, quelle " qu'en soit Is teneur ou 1'ori- gine (done is G.R.U. egale- ment) y sent classes. Le K.G.B. a, en outre, deux mis- sions, lone offensive (es- plonnage). et I'autre defen- sive (contra-espionnage). Le G.R.U. n'en a qu'une princl- palement : le renseignement offensif, qui releve plus par- ticulierement du domains militaire. L'aspect defenaif du role du K.G.B. sexerce meme au mein de 1'armee et d^ Q.R.U.- il'1'!~'gl'lii I glml to I' i.inll,l Ij Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 LA MEUSE-LA LANI'ERNE, Brussels 1 April 1970 SOVIET SPY IN BELGIUM FOR THREE YEARS Boris Savitch, an intelligence agent for the GRU (the chief intelligence unit of the Soviet General Staff), who had been working in Belgium since Oc- tober 1967 under the cover of the Scaldia-Volga automobile company in Diegem (Brussels) was arrested by State Security last week as he was finishing a meal with a "contact" in a Linkebeek (Brussels) restaurant. Savitch was carrying a Minox miniature camera, a large amount of film and a great deal of money. He was interested in the activities of NATO-SHAPE and in the Mirage 5, the French fighter-bomber ordered by the Belgian army. At the moment of his arrest, the spy attempted to escape. Both Savitch and his contact were taken into custody. They are still being interrogated by the Belgian Security forces, which is continuing its investigation throughout the country. Other Soviets ostensibly working in Belgium may be implicated in the affair. Savitch is the eighth Soviet agent whose activities have been discovered in Belgium in the past three years. Boris Savitch was born in Zhitmir, a city in the Ukraine (USSR) in 1934. He is 36 years old. Small, broad-backed, with wavy black hair, he is very talkative. He is married and has two sons. His apartment is located in the Scaldia-Volga building in Diegem, near the offices of the secretary-general of NATO, located in the commune of Evere. Savitch was sent to Belgium by the company in October 1967 as an engineering specialist. He obtained a work permit for Belgium, stating his official occupation as selling Scaldia-Volga trucks. This cover gave him great freedom of movement. Truck Salesman Savitch began his clandestine activities by first attempting to utilize radical left-wing anti-NATO groups to achieve his purposes in SHAPE. He was looking for collaborators. During a routine operation, the State Security became interested in him and began a close surveillance, shadowing him con- stantly-Shadowing is one of the techniques utilized by the counter-espionage services. It is not an absolutely reliable technique, but at least it helps determine whether or not the subject is a professional spy. In this matter, his behavior during movements is very significant. This surveillance led to the arrest of the "truck salesman" on Wednesday, March 25. On that day, Savitch and a contact were in a restaurant in the Linkebeek suburb of Brussels.* It is a fine, well-run place; the owner pre- pares the meals and the wife waits- on the table. "Open-air dining in a private and quiet location," the restaurant's advertisements say. It is the perfect spot for a rendezvous! A large parking lot surrounds the house. The property forms an enclave in the surrounding property. An access road is big enough for one car at a time to pass. It is an ideal spot: 1. for the location; 2. for its respectability;,. for its reputation; 4. for its food. Approved For Release 1999/09/022: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Savitch was able to appreciate all this. In fact, he had reportedly gone there several times before with a guest: a "contact" or a "truck salesman" or even a comrade from the Soviet Embassy, which he visited frequently and where he enjoyed certain privileges. On this particular day, Savitch and his guest were eating in the inside dining room of the restaurant. They were just finishing their meal. It was near 1500 hours. At that moment, a car entered the grounds. Four State Security agents got out. The two diners were confronted. Savitch, obviously panic-stricken, started to run, abandoning his guest, who stood rooted to,the spot. The agents caught the fugitive. The two-men were searched and taken into custody. A Miniature Camera When they searched Savitch, the Security Force found he was carrying a Minox miniature camera, a large supply of film, a great sum of money, and a map of a clandestine rendezvous. At the time of his arrest, the "truck sales- man" was trying to obtain information about Belgian military bases and about SHAPE-NATO. Savitch was especially interested in the Mirage, the French-made fighter-bomber which has been ordered by the Belgian army. Pilot training courses for the aircraft have already been set up.' The Soviets wanted infor- mation concerning the manufacturing of the Mirages. Other Soviets may be involved in the affair. An investigation is under- way in Brussels and in the provinces. The Minister of Justice announced yesterday that he had issued a deportation order against Savitch. The order had not yet been carried out. With this new affair, Soviet espionage again reveals the multiplicity of its "cover" activities, and shows that it does not hesitate to utilize all the machinery of the Soviet Union, but in the USSR and in Soviet enterprises a- broad. Thus, another of its covers has been unmasked. There have been other cases where a Communist "private" enterprise was serving as a cover for in- telligence agents. Notably, there was the case of Aeroflot in 1967. The many-armed structure of the Soviets' specialized organizations in- volved in espionage covers many areas: diplomacy, the press, tourism, scientific exchanges, and even commerce. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : blA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 CPYFj loved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 ' ,L-A MEUSE-LA LANTERNE du mercredi, 1"-4-1970 CPYRGHT Boris Savitch, officier de renseignement do G.R.U. (di- rection principale du rensei- gnement de 1'etat-major ge- neral sovittique), travafilant on Belgique depuis octobre 1867 sous to couvert de Is firme automobile a Scaldia- Volga s. i Diegem IBruxel- ies), a etE arrete, Is semaine derniere, par is Sfiretc de 1'Etat slots qu'il terminait de diner to compagnie d'un a contact . dans an restau- rant de Linkebeek (Bruxel- les). fl avast Siff lul on . Ml- nox s (spparetl photographi- que miniature). one impor- tante reserve de films et one grosse Somme d'argent. 11 L 'interessait aux activates .T.A,N,-Shape et au . Mira- ge 5 , avion chasseur-bom- bardier frangais dent I'armee beige a passe commando. An moment de on arres- tation. I'espion a tenth de fuir. Savitcb et son contact out Ste emmenes. ILc sont encore Interrogea par Is Sfi-? rate beige, qua poursult son enquete dens tout It pays. D'suttes Sovietiques . tra- vaillant+. en Belgique pour- ralent 2tre ampllques dans 1'affaire. Saviteh est It hui- tlcme agent sovtetlque connu pour -es activates en Belgique durant lea trots derni6res an- nee%. Boris Savitch est rid A Jitomir, ville d'Ukraine (UR.S.S.). enr 1934. If a done 36 ans. Petit, rAble. cheveux noirs ondules. l'homme est volubile. 11 est ma- rie et a 2 gargons. Son loge- ment eat sltut dans le complexe Scaadia-Volga, A Diegem, a pro- xUm)tk des instaliatlonsr du se- cretariat gbndral de 1O.TA.N.. inota 1 our le terrltoIre de Is commune d'Evere. Ehn octobre 1967, it est envoy* en Belgique par to firme oomme ingenieur- sp8clallste. 11 obtlent ainst un perrnls de travail daps notre pays, sea occupations officielles oonsIstant A vendre des camions de Is .marque. Cette oouverture lut assure de grander llbertks " dEplacentent, Marchand de camions Savitch commence des aoti- vlter clandeotines en tentant tout d'abord d'utiliser des mou- vements anti-O.T.A.N. d'extrd- me gauche pour arriver a ses fins au Shape. I! cherche des agents compiaisants. Lord d'un travail de routine. Is Siarete de ]'Fiat s'interesse a lui et com- mence une surveillance serree. filature sur filature. La filature est one des'. techniques utllisece par lea services de eontre-espionna- ge. Cc n'est pas one techni- que de tout repas. Elle per. met an moins de determiner si It a file > est oul ou non on profesolonnel de i'esplon- nare. Son comportement en tours de depiacement eat tree significatlt pour eels. Cette surveillance a abouti, It mercredt 25 mars dernier, a I'ar- restatlon du + vendeur de ca- talpa *, Ce jour-1h, Boris Sa- vltch et un ? oontact. dtaient dams un restaurant de 'la ban- lieue de Bruxelles, A Linkebeek. Endrolt carAn et blest tenu : le patron prbpare lea repas, sa femme Bert A table. ? Le grand air daps on site retire at tran- i uille ., dit Is publialb6 de 1eta- blissement. N'est-ce pas ]a le lieu reve pour une rencontre f Un vaste parking entoure Is matron. La propridte constitue une enclave dans Ies proprietks volslnes. Un sentier permet It passage dune seule voiture a is tots. C'est un endrott ideal : 1) pour sa situation : 2) pour son serleux 3>` pour son cadre de standing ; 41 par sa r table . Savitch a su appreeier tout cells. Il s'y strait, en effet. rendu plusteurs fold precedetnment avec un Invit@, < Contact v ou < acheteur de camion.s ou en- core camarede sovletique de I'ambassade. ambassade of) 11 se rendalt frequommcnt et ou 11 benkficiait de certaines faveurs. Ce mercredl-13, Savitch et son invite du jour &talent a table dans Is sa11e inttrieure ?u res- taurant. Its terrnfnaient le repass IJ 6tait prAs de 18 heures. Une volture pCn,tra a ce moment daps Is proprietb. Quatre ins- pecteurs de Is SAretk de I'Etat., en descendirent, Les deux oonvCr vas furent interpeilEs, Savitch, manlfestaxnent affole, prlt Is futte, abandonnant IA son invite. qua recta figk sur place. Les inspecteurs rattraperent It fugt- tif. Les deux homtnes furent fou1116s et emuneneas. Un apparel! photo miniature Au court de la foutIle, la Bare- tE trouva sur Savitch un ~iga";- 'd fraudula t elections is the Pa:: Vy-IV gain., rather than loss. l:~ose k,.o ave left the Pai dt c f "far long f rs o C e1tilu'i1l u t n "'`al's il~aEa.bi v' ne;y k "r e.a a~17eJ .r .. I.t, as do hove o v 's C: ho ars Still raxt~T il~ l:~tGy^ i o Nho would ZOlv' egret the dese t:iori of a corrade? But it is not the nature of Co,-=a nie s to beg those V2o do Flo t 4 h to be Ca.ai.unis is tO 'continue as such. his is the Party of ` he rJ:.ii~t"'~: s of t+o:,wn and coa?try th a -L Pa t~7 of ~t J the y J. :. vVOl.Lu IO:aFir'y i+x'~Es.1CE; uLe~+',...:e ;L~''tErC.1 wncan place t1ntr:lr skills al: he d ncs c,1. of a social C,:.ciuadi that is di:i'iEl"Eatt from 'L:iEfi.:: but more evol tio+la y. he f a+ ' re ;ad workers, J4.4_..1 remain in this Party, because they need i t as an ins--tx t-mnt for t eir battles, lust as the guerC illy 1~'Pubor needs his o=. The' Cotrr:lJ:nist Party Ur. 1 staunch it s wounds, acid ebuild what has boon destroyed. it well emerge from this crisis more " n fed and more pow r i'u3 , as the only ho pa for liberation among the op- s d masses of Venezuelan people. the PCV Harbors No 111-Will In the case of professionals arid other individuals who have legit the arty, on the assumption that they may have been supra and might E. sh &c return to their positions as combatants in the Communist Part-Y3 their, re- ords will be studied indiv=idually, without any ill-,?i11 or retaliation. his Party., as alma s, belongs to all revolutionaries. No-one here is de- fed an opportunity to fight for a just cause. In this Party, as in no ther, one can disagree aai h the views of the majority within any of t e pities which comprise the. Communist Party str .cture. he eWillPass At the moments the splinter groups ar in style, both on TV and radio d. in the big newspapers. It suits both the imperialists arid the bowrgeoi- ie to show those willing to desert that they 411 be well received and incorporated into the systexa. Any force which dissociates itself fro.r. a ommunist Party, whether large, suall or miniscule;, trill be built up by the dvertising media in the service of the ens ies of the people, at least for while. That is how it has always been, and always will be. The func ons f the new Party will be attanded, as proof that, in order to succeed, one eed only cease to be a Corrm nist. Eir Fate Sooner or later, these splinter groups which have been harming the V organization for years, will be confronted with internal problems. For e time being, they are united by the mutual desire to bring the yr eatLS t ossible harm to the Communist Party; but this "vein" will soon give out. afore the New Years sun has warmed, disputes will crop out, and those to had illusion s ' of princ::;-les outside the Communist ranks will get a asta of hours of 'endless oittcxrness. Approved For Release 1999/09/0: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 CPYA I?ved For Release 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-01194A000300140001-8 Today, 11:: ~' O?,".' 1 is .u'U ioc3x``Lay r. c Zi o1;a:i-I a slight recovery, whole 1-6- v gions have remained t:y l to ''who -~w-'ty'u Individuals 1;7'10 differ ma ^ked f from me have ret,4ainod in the l artyutp .tolding their point of it iCti.'+ a Enccur- grog nos has arrivod from a"22. parts of the, cool t17, about individuals, both o Ld and young, who hater-, c i`e,. sed their loyalty to the Col;ur uhist Cause. Our fellow ?1'rrrt:r.tis i6:1e t$iai':;t ovsr4,""Iv .AAQ `~~" ia~?a?Y7r; ilia L3~ro~i 0 t.01idi city. C:Cii1i- a`}'Ea not aid a=:4 Fral.":ti...re- CL-:3s3 and the W70"kii^iZ farmers are on ?u,. side a These soc. i l classes do not believe i i -Iairy tales. The I,nork- iig People have faith in Cca:l:':t:rra.ist Party; and., even though taey r atir SS .^ye r Lndiffs';ont or ai.oof, they are on the side of the Lv:i,1iLZ7i;7t+S, '-',t i6 CtiJ a.a ,. U L ?;iv tii ' U ` pr.ista sing democr”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp79-01194a000300140001-8: CA PROPAGANDA PERSPECTIVES
Synopsis
“Approved For Release 2001/09/11: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500490257-1 U.S. Officials Only CONFIDENTIAL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT COUNTRY French Equatorial Africa SUBJECT Medical Facilities 25XII A PLACE ACQUIRED (eY SOURCE) DATE ACQUIRED (aY SOURCE) DATE (OF INFO.) 101r OOCUY[FT COOTLIOi 141........ ......... T.. ..IIO..I 017140$ 01 T0f Y41 TOO STATES. II Txl4 TNt 411RT44 Of TITLE. IS. SECTIONS )t1 .00 is.. 01 T., ..at. L{ 401[00[0. ITS T.LNf41ff100 ON 1100[. L.1100 0, ITS COE TEOTf f0 Of OIC[IIT LT LN YO&UT00.I LL0 Ill{Ow If tflNI., TOO S NLTTODY[T, Ox Dl tx f S[r Q!TT_10 1404401^IT[Q. DATE DISTR. a, I NO. OF PAGES 2 NO. OF ENCLS. SUPP. TO REPORT NO. 1. Each governmental district, called a "departments in French Equatorial Africa, maintains a hospital. '(here is a hospital at Fort Archambault which has approximately 100 beds for natives and 20 beds-for whites. The hospital has a maternity ward and operating facilities, 25X1X 2. In 1952 there was considerable talk about setting up an x-ray laboratory, but his has not yet been dune. 3? The hospital is headed by a French doctor and there is another French doctor assisting him. Botb of these doctors have to spend considerable time traveling through the area checking on the prevalence of sleeping sickness and other diseases. 4. All medical supplies for these district hospitals come from France by way of Brazzaville. bl'- "T up several dispensaries in the Fort Archnmbault area. Al]. -,here dispen:T..,-.es must be sanctioned by the government in Brazzaville. Although the local French doctor has no control over the establishment of liaj.ansariee, he does exercise considerable control in the type of treat- inent which may be given in these dispensaries. 6. ]''or eXsVr..L:, registered nurse who was running one of the dispensaries near Fort Archainbault had been acting as midwife with the full approval of the local doctor, However, this doctor was transferred and the roan who took his place refused to allow her to practice midwifery since she had no persit, even though she was a registered nurse and had not lost a patient. U.S. Officials Only CONFIDENTIAL ~OISTRI OUT I ON I 'STATE ARMY NAVY I AIR _ ~TFUI h Sl -TX~ This report is for the use within the USA of the Intelligence components of the Departments or Agencies indicated above, It is not to be transmitted overseas without the concurrence of the originating emce through the Assistant Director of the ORlcc of Collection and Dissemination, CIA, Approved For Release 2001/09/11: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500490257-1 Approved For Release 2001/09/11: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500490257-1 CO.Yii'IDENTIAL/ US OFFICIALS ONLY 25X1X 7. Nearly all of the medical supplies are sent from the US. Occasionally in an emergency it is possible to obtain supplies through the nearest French hospital, although again this is a matter for the French doctor to,decide. 8. The Pasteur Institute in Brazzaville is doing extensive research on native diseases and maintains a large hospital. the 25X1X Pasteur Institute also maintains some administrative control over the district. doctors. The French doctors working in these "department" hospitals ordinarily serve a two year tour of duty and then return to France. The staff at the Pasteur Institute, however, does not suffer from such a rapid turn- over of personnel. 857.11 8c 857.41 BG 8557.197 8c 64o.o99 B 8c CONFIDENTIAL/US OFFICIALS ONLY Approved For Release 2001/09/11: CIA-RDP80-00809A000500490257-1”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp80-00809a000500490257-1: MEDICAL FACILITIES
Synopsis
“25X1C1Ob Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 CPYRGHT AedrRelease 20 23.May 1969 S V I ET DISSIDEIITS III PROTEST TO UhN.. .Text Given to Newsmen Says Rights Are 'Repressed' CPYRQHT __---- MOSCOW, May 22 - More than 50 Soviet dissidents, alarmed at the growing nutn- ber of arrests of their fellows, have drawn up a petition to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, calling for an investigation of "the repres- sion of basic civil rights in the Soviet Union." The petition was drafted two days ago and it was not known whether the text had actually been sent out of the Soviet Union. The dissidents made it available to Western corre- spondents apparently in the hope of reaching the United Nations through Western news- papers. The petition said the recent! arrests have compelled us to think that Soviet punitive organs have decided finally tol bar the activity of people pro-; testing against arbitrariness in Tour country." Coincident with the petition, it was also learned today that Ilya Burmistrovich, a 31-year- old mathematician, was sen- tenced yesterday by a Moscow court to three years in prison for circulating typescripts of works of the imprisoned au- thors Andrei D. Sinyavsky and Yuli M. Daniel to some friends. He was arrested on April 16, 1968, and spent more than a) year in jail before his one-day trial. He was convicted under Ar ( titles 190 and 191 of the Rus- sian Federation criminal code against the spreading of anti- ;Soviet slander. Earlier this week, Ilya Gabai, n teacher of the Russian lan guage, was arrested, and docti~ 1. tents putting forth the case of Crimean Tatars were seized. with him. I 'On Satlin's orders the Crime- an Tatars were expelled from their' homeland during World 'War II on charges of collabora- tion with the Germans. Even though the minority has been of ,ficially rehabilitated, its mem- bers have not been able to re- turn to the Crimean area - ,around the Black Sea from their ,places of exile. mostly in So- -Viet Central Asia. Their plight has attracted the ,'.interest of many dissidents,. who Kaye tried to publiciz' :,heir case through western media. ; 5?vl '.to harsh restrlel.ionia: lease 2000/08/29 : CIAl' ay t9qtA000500100001-0 CPYRGHT SOVIET AND CSI N . ARE SAID TO CLASHi Fighting on Central Asian Border Is Reported MOSCOW, May 10 (UPI)-` Well informed sources said to. day that Soviet and Chinese troops clashed in "serious bor- der incidents" in Central Asia several times this week. They said these incidents oc- curred on the border separating Soviet Kazakhstan and China's Sinkiang region. Both sides suffered casualties, tr ese sources said. There was no official confir- mation of the incidents. The Soviet Union is conducting mil itary maneuvers along the Si- berian and Far Eastern stretches of its border with China. At least 50 Russian troops' were killed in border incidents: ..on the Ussuri River in the Far East on March 2 and March 15. Sources said the border in Central Asia has been "very. tense" for scevral ? weeks. There were persistent reports that the border situation be-. tween Sinkiang and Kazakstan has been tense. .since' thb early stages of :the Chinese-Soviet ,dispute. Pravda, the. Communist party newspaperY :.recently disclosed that more than 200 persons weer killed when; they tried to cross from China to the Soviet Union in::'May, 1962. First Ship This Year MOSCOW May 10 (Reuters) -a Soviet ship has started up the Ussuri' River on a voyage that will take it near the scene Of border clashes between China dlid the Soviet Union in March. A' Moscow radio correspond- ent in Khabarovsk reported that the Ship had set out from there on the first voyage of the year up the border river. The ship is heading for Iman, the nearest large town to the scene of the clashes. . . The River was frozen and i covered with ::now at the time) of the border battles in March. It was reported clear of ice at the end of April. The latest account from the area, reported in the '. news paper 'Sovietskaya 'Rossiya on May 1, said the:.Chiriesc had stopped sporadic shelling and were contenting. themselves with shouting insults through bullhorns. Approved For Release 2000/08/19: 444 4 A' 00001-0 CF~Yf~ghT SANOMAT, Helsinki 3 Rele se 2000/QOA?AI 1 pTg 11 Q00500100001-0 FEVER SH MEDIATION IN THE FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY QUARREL CPYRGHT e communes party o the ovie union is mediating the Internaa disputes of the F nnish Communist Party. Aleksey Belyakov, the chief of the Scandinavian on of the CPSU, has been leading the negotiations with representatives of the different camps of the FCP since last Monday. He has recommended to chairman Aarne Saarinen, former Secretary General Ville Pessi, and one of the opposition leaders, Taisto Sinisalo - who have visited the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki -;the arranging of an extraordinary FCP party congress. The Extraordinary congress would renew the central committee of the FCP in such a way that.. the internal opposition would abandon its plans to found a new communist party, he has suggested. Belyakov, who landed in Helsinki on Monday unnoticed, is accompanied by Pravda's writer Stefan Smirnov - signature "Observer" - and by World Peace Council Secretary Nikolay Voshinin. Aarne Saarinen was immediately called to the Soviet Embassy, where the CPSU representatives are staying, and where he heard the greetings of the CPSU leadership. The previously presented demand of the CPSU, that a split of the opposition's plans to.found a new communist party but also the demands of the supporters of the party's present policy for a party purge. were condemned. As far as is known, the big district organization meeting of next weekend arranged by those who walked out of the 15th Party Congress of the FCP was merely touched on at the meeting; the CPSU representatived did not demand .a cancellation of the meeting. Ville Pessi, formerly Secretary General and presently secretary for International Affairs pf the FCP, arrived at the Soviet Embassy on Tuesday !at noon-time. The CPSU representatives announced that they trust him in a ,mediating role. It was noted in the disscussions that the internal situation in the FCP has led to a blind'alley. One can get out of this dilemma only by the friendly assistance of fraternal parties and by the different FCP camps desire for reconciliation. Belyakov, who before and during the FCP congress tried to bring the FCP's ranks into order, suggested as a possibility that the central committee call together an extraordinary party congress. A compromise proposal, according to which opposition representatives would also be elected to the central committee, would be prepared and accepted by the party's membership before the extraordinary congress. According to the FCP's by-laws,. an extraordinary congress can be con- voked in two weeks. The delegates of the ordinary congress would be .delegates to the extraordinary congress too; in this case, it would be the same delegates as those-who were at the 15th party congress during Easter holidays. One obstacle,however, is the fact that the FCP's by-laws prescribe that the central committee is elected by a regular party congress. Party organization technicians, however, have discovered a way around this: The by-laws say nothing about long the mandate of the central committee is. The by-laws say that "the mandate of the central.committee lasts until a new central coFommittee's members could be persuaded to abandon their seats volunta- A~Yihsrtpsii"bi=0i~ffe'rplos-sibil7Ey wo J" beYgo-c~iange the pes of arty's CPYRGHT MPPI by-laws by a two-thirds majority and then to elect a new leadership. This procedure would, however, take three months. Sinisalo is planned as the leader of a new party Some members of the FCP leadership and certain opposition circles are, however, doubtful about holding an extraordinary party congress. It is assumed that the majority is sharply against compromise proposals. The communists, on the other hand, are waiting for the results of the Stalinist meeting. The Stalinist group which meets on Saturday in Helsinki and on Sunday in Uusimaa might even decide to found a new communist party. Strong groups in the FCP's district organizations of Turku, Uusimaa, Kymenlaakso, south Karelia, Lahti,~and Kuopio are leaning in this direction. Smaller groups have been gathered to support this effort from other district organiz- ations as well; the pensioners in particular have been a welcome power reserv for the FCP opposition in the struggle for power. However, it is surmised within the FCP that the opposition will not, at least at this stage, found a new party. It is assumed that the opposition will stake everything on one card: All or nothing. The opposition has prepared a "Shadow" program. Adoption of this pro- gram would probably lead to the dismissal of some of the opposition leaders from their posts. In such a case, it would be easier to explain the founding of a new party to the membership and the fraternal parties. The opposition group also contains some extreme elements who are of the opinion that the founding of a new communist party cannot be avoided. It has even been planned in some district, organizations that Taisto Sinisalo would become the chairman of the new party. Among the names suggested for the new party are "Finnish communist workers party" or "Finnish workers' communist party." The Opposition Rejected a Proposal on Reconciliation About 2,000 communists from all over the country have been mobilized for the meeting of the opposition on Sunday. Bus-loads of people will come from districts which are loyal to the party leadership. E.G. a bus-load of pensioners from northern Finland will come to Helsinki to approve the resol- utions of the opposition meeting and to become acquainted with Helsinki at the same time. Only dyed-in-the-wool Stalinists have received an invitation to the opposition's meeting. Access to the meeting for persons who support the party's line has been sharply refused. Negotiations about a reconciliation between the different camps of the FCP are being held today. Representatives of the party leadership and the opposition are meeting in Helsinki. They will deal with a conciliatory proposal presented by the official party leadership; the proposal has been rejected by the opposition. The opposition is expected to present its own demands today. -0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 2 Ed W i i t !r .Q~0~L:Me d lRP,P MO fli3 M CPYRGHT Positions in Opposition Districts ooe0001-0 The information that some of the districts in which the Opposition is in. control have softened their position and are ready to negotiate comes as a surprise if we recall the demand made in the Opposition congress that it be recognized as a faction and that negotiations be held with a 95-member committee of its own choosing. Thus it now seems that the Opposition is not, after all, standing "as solid as granite" as it vowed as late as a couple weeks ago. Thus it seems to be a matter of the regular party leadership, which was stymied on party regulations, winning the opening round on the procedural matter. If certain Opposition districts have in fact softened their position, it means the strengthening of the "third line" on the example of the Tampere District. The decisive, behind-the-scenes factor in this kind of change is the negative attitude of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) con- cerning the establishment of a second Finnish Communist party. Nevertheless, it is not a matter of the whole Opposition going tame. One sign of this is the fact that the Opposition is establishing parallel organiza- tions in districts that are under the control of the regular party leadership. This means that the Opposition itself is breaking up into two parts: "a third line," whose idea is to stay within the regular party, and the "irreconcilables" who are driving toward the establishment of their own party. Or else the party is sitting on two stools: in opening the door to reconciliation just a crack, they are not closing the door that leads to a party split. In undertaking to negotiate district by district, the Opposition stays within the bounds of party regulations and in that way saves its face before the CPSU. At the same time, it saves its face in its own eyes in that negotiators in the districts can at the same time be members of the afore- mentioned negotiating committee of the Opposition as a whole. If no agreement is reached in the negotiations, the Opposition can still claim to have followed party regulations, but at the same time it will have a ready-made party organization. ppositioplirien asenne Jos eraat oppositiopiirit oust to. lohkeamassa kahteen osaan, puo- Tiedat ainakin erai~ien Skp:n lueen sisalla pysymiscen tahtaa- oppositio iirien Bella lieventaneet asenteitaaxt, p pehmenneista vaan "kolmantcen linjaan" ja asenteista ja neuvotteluvalmiu. morkitsee se Tampereen piirin esl- Oman puolueen perustamiseea pyr= desta ovate yl19tt9via, jos palau.te- merkin mukaisen "kolmannen, lin- kiviin "leppymti.ttomiin". Tai sitten taan mieleen opposition suurko- jan" vahvistumista nilssa. T511al- oppositio istuu kahdella tuolilla: kouksen vaatimus sen tunnusta- son muutoksen taustatekij5n9 on raotettaessa sovinnon ovea ei puo- misesta ryhmakunnaksl ja ncu- ratkaisevalta osatta pidettava Neu- luehadaannuksen ovea sulieta. vottelujen kaymisesta sen asetta- vostoliiton kommunistisen puo- Ryhtyessaan neuvottelemaan pii- man 95-jasonisen neuvottelukun- luccn kieltcista kantaa toisen suo- reittaln oppositio pysyy puolue- nan kanssa. Nyt naytt5a sits silts, malalsen kommunistisen puolueen saantojen puitteissa ja siin5 mie- ettel oppositio seisokaan "jyrlcka- perustamista kohtaan. lessa s9lyttaa kasvonsa Nkp:n na kuin Kyseessa ei kuitenkaan ole koko graniitti" ainakaan tassa edessii. Lisaksi se saattaa sailyt- suhteessa, kuten sen taholta vlela opposition kesyyntyminen. Siihen taa kasvonsa myos omissa silmis- pars viilckoa sitten vannottiin. Pa. viittaa jo opposition toimesta tear- satin, sills piirien neuvottelijat remminkin an kysymys. puolue- joitettava rinnakkaisorganisaatiot- voivat 011a myos em. opposition saantoihin tukeutuneen puolue- den perustaminen puoluejohdon neuvottelukunnan jasenia. Jos johdon alkueravoltosta menettely- haliussa oleviin plireihin. Tama ncuvoi touon ar.atn ~ku:ac k n ntnou- tzpakysymyksessa. merkitsee sits, etta oppositio on nrtL;,. as puoluecn saanLuJa Ja .r a Approved For Release 2000/08/29-: CIA-RDFI9"-JI'i MAM6W"P00001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 -CL ERQP79-01194A000500100001-0 69/6-2 UNDIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION. OF EAST GERMANY 1. May 1969 can be. entered on political calendars as the month during which East Germany's Walter Ulbricht thought the pendulum was swinging his way. Official diplomatic recognition granted East-Germany by three non- Communist governments -- Iraq, Cambodia and the Sudan -- has given Ulbricht the entree he thinks he needs to gain broad acceptance of the concept of "GDR sovereignty" in: time to. celebrate his regime's 20th anniversary in October of this year. 2. Our aim is to get our assets and mass media tapped into a concerted propaganda effort to clarify for Third World audiences, and to remind Third World leaders about, the oft-repeated but apparently forgotten fact-of-life concerning Germany and the underlying reason why the pendulum does not swing in Ulbricht's favor: "East Germany" is a temporary, artificial structure whose survival depends mainly on the continuing presence of 20 Soviet Army divisions and, further, that diplomatic recognition of this government does entail a choice between East and West. Third World leaders, even the more radical ones, might well be reluctant to undertake action that would antago- nize Bonn, which in both short and long-range-terms offers greater economic advantages than does Pankow. 3. To accomplish our aim, the following themes are among many which could be embellished in terms of local conditions. Support material from which to draw is found in the attached unclassified backgrounder and samp- ling of current newspaper clips. a. Iraqi, Cambodian and Sudanese diplomatic accords with East Germany represent acts based on emotion, not logic, and were payoffs for services rendered. They were also clearly the result of heavy Soviet pressures. b. Ulbricht gratuitously buttressed the case for non- recognition by his ostentatious May Day military parades and boast of "20 years of socialist military policy." c. The paucity of what East Germany can offer the Third World in terms of trade and aid, particularly in comparison with what West Germany. offers, should not be ignored. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 $C I~QP79-01194A000500100001-0 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 ?rTnT? TT (TTT V June 1969 As a May Day rememberance for 1969, Walter Ulbricht's East German regime was rewarded with a long sought-after prize: cognizance by some non-Communist states of the German Democratic Republic's official exist- ence. Plans to grant diplomatic recognition to East Germany were announced on 30 April by the Government of Iraq and, eight days later, by the Government of Cambodia. At his first press conference held after the 25 May military coup which brought him to power, Sudan's new Premier Awadallah announced his government's intention to emulate Iraq. Ulbricht has long been convinced that just one non-Communist commit- ment would start a chain reaction throughout the Arab, African., and Asian worlds inspiring country after country to scramble onto a bandwagon labeled "GDR sovereignty." The East German regime already is recognized in all but name by many Third World countries through reciprocal trade missions or full-blown consulates. Now it is Ulbricht's ambition that these relationships be dignified by the highest sounding title in time for the East German 20th anniversary celebrations in October 1969 and presumably he believes that recognition thrice in a month will give his scheme the impetus it badly needs. Stepped up efforts to gain official status throughout the Third World can be expected within the next few weeks despite two great stumbling blocks, one military and the other economic, both of which portend a miscarriage of Ulbricht's ambition. May Day Rememberances The Iraqi, Cambodian, and Sudanese diplomatic acceptances of East Germany are matters of vested interest -- born not out of respect for "GDR sovereignty" but out of need to pay for past and probably promised future East German support on ticklish national or international issues. Of at least equal importance is the intense pressure the Soviet Union has exerted on these countries on behalf of East Germany, the leverage for which comes from years of intense cultivation and considerable economic and military aid programs. Iraq, for instance, received advanced-type Soviet MIG fighters well before Egypt. Moscow certainly has a very active interest in securing legitimization outside of the Communist Bloc for the "state" it created in East Germany. East German backing for almost every Arab cause sometimes exceeds even Moscow's pro-Arab endorsements -- particularly with regard to the Palestinian Arabs. The Iraqis specifically cited East German "support for the Palestinian peoples' just struggle to liberate their usurped homelands" as a reason for bestowing diplomatic recognition. On 23 April the East German Foreign Ministry issued a statement supporting Iraq in Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 _A.nnrnven Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 its border dispute with Iran (over Shatt-al-Arab), something the USSR has failed to do, and described Iran's actions as "imperialist provoca- tions." Iraqi gratitude was reflected in Radio Baghdad's statement that,East Germany's "noble attitude toward our national issues" was just another reason for extending recognition.. Cambodia's diplomatic obeisance is another sign of extreme national sensitivity about the lack of world acknowledgment of Cambodian borders. Statements issued in both Pankow and Phnom Penh suggest that the new diplomatic ties are a belated reward to East Germany for her long- standing recognition of the border delineations most acceptable to Cambodia. On 5 May, Sheikh Ali Abdel Rahman, Sudan's leftist Foreign Minister and Deputy Premier, held a press conference at which he said he had recommended to the Sudanese Cabinet that Sudan follow in Iraq's footsteps in recognizing the German Democratic Republic because it was a "friendly country with honorable attitudes toward Arab causes." At that time, the suggestion was intepreted as designed to counteract a movement in the Sudanese Constituent Assembly to reestablish relations with West Germany and the U.S.A. However, the 25 May military coup which overthrew President Ismail el Azhari also thrust radicalism into a much more powerful position in Sudan. The new Prime Minister Babiker Awadalla held his first press conference two days later and announced that his government's first act of foreign policy would be to recognize East Germany because of "the East Berlin regime's opposition to Israel." A May Day Blunder While Moscow and all the other members of the Warsaw Pact this year eschewed their annual spring show of military prowess, Walter Ulbricht celebrated the day with loud and, enthusiastic saber-rattling throughout East Germany. Speeches by military leaders and four parades featuring missiles, tanks, and heavy artillery marked May Day in East Berlin as dedicated to "20 years of socialist military policy." This is the facet of Walter Ulbricht that must be understood by anyone toying with the acceptance of "GDR sovereignty': he remains the ever-ready hangman and executor for the Warsaw Pact, for the Brezhnev Doctrine -- the true "Stalinist" of Central Europe. May Day 1969 in East Berlin rekindled mew-cries of 21 August 1968 when Ulbricht's troops, mercenaries of the Soviet Union, were among those forces that moved into and occupied the sovereign state of Czechoslovakia. Warsaw Pact utilization of German troops, permitting them to march into a neighboring country, above all one previously occupied by Nazi Germany, was a flagrant violation of the Potsdam Agree- ment. Even the USSR, in August 1968, soon saw the grave error of sanctioning GDR military presence in occupied Czechoslovakia: all the wind went out of Soviet propaganda which was trying to portray the West Germans as the "aggressors plotting invasion." Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 00/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Perhaps Ulbricht relies on man's short-lived memory of painful incidents to help him over this "military " stumbling block of his own making? The False Image The economic stumbling block, also of Ulbricht's personal making since it is the system he imposes which causes the troubles, is equally insurmountable. Facts belie the image of an attractive trading partner which Ulbricht promotes throughout the Third World. However anxious East Germany may be to win political support, the fact remains that this regime has little to offer in economic terms to the Third World, particularly in comparison with West Germany. Jeune Afrique (Paris, 31 March - 6 April 1969) gives details of exports from Western countries to the Near East during 1967, showing that after the United States and Britain, West Germany was the third leading supplier of these countries, with almost twice as much, by value, as Italy and more than twice as much as France. West Germany was the second largest exporter to Iraq and also to the UAR (the value,was U.S. $54,800,000) despite the break in diplomatic relations with West Germany by both countries in 1965. By contrast, the East German-UAR trade protocol for 1969, which represents an increase of 25 percent over 1968, allows for a total-volume of exchanges of only about U.S. $8,500,000. Le Moniteur Africain (Dakar, 3 April 1969) describes the recent growth of West German trade with African countries. Statistics given indicate the African continent as a whole has a very healthy balance of trade with West Germany -- a positive factor for Africa. Overall, 7.52 percent of West German imports come from Africa and that continent in turn absorbs 4.62 percent of West German exports. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 3 CPYtGHT CPYR HT F i lV6c ':r Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 Y 1969 East Germans, Alone in Soviet Bloc Sprcf.l to The New York TIme. BERLIN, May 1-Commu- .nists and Socialists of all shades 'marked May Day in this divided 'city, today with four parades, including a military show of power in East Berlin. East Germany was the only Soviet-bloc country this year to parade its, forces to 'under- line its military strength. A speaker at the parade on Marx- '.Engcls-Platz in East Berlin ,noted that East Germany had conducted "20 cars of socialist military policy.' The three Western allied commandants condemned the display as a violation of the city's four-power status and held the. Soviet Union re- sponsible for. permitting East German military personnel to take part in the - May Day celebrations. "The militaristic nature', of the celebration was accentu LE MONDE 10 May 1969 Pout-fl appliquer la doctrine fit meme allusion & la possibilito de is reviewin its mea re stock of counter- no uvec !-inrome so seIGOMM9,~-GM-RDP79-044S4A 5004 WaQ1n&cctivc for enh c' so fa~artse~200Oq/O8 9' $A-RDP79-UilI94A07 Q5OO31 1OOQ1n&cctive for dealing with Baghdad's fait accompli, The Bonn, 9 mai.. - A la diffe- rence do 1'Irak, dons la d6ci- 'ion do reconnaitre la R6publi- quo democratique allemande avail ate annonceo a la fin do la semaine derniore, lo cas du Cambodge, qui a pris 'une dyci- sion identique, pose a Bonn uno question do principe. L'Irak, on offot, n'ontretenait plus do relations diplomatiquos avec Ia. Republique f6d6rale depuis Ia crises ongendreo on 1965 par la decision du gouvernoment Erhard do recon. naitre 1'Etat d'Israiil. La famouse doctrine Hallstein -, qui posait en principe, dopuis 1955, 1'impossibilite pour Bonn d'entretenir des relations diplomatiquos avoc un Etat ayant un i ambassadour a Borlin- Est, n'dtait donc pas on cause. La question se pose, on revanche, pour lo Cambodgo, ou la Rypubliquo f6d6rale entrotiont une ambassad.e depuis is 15 novembre 1967 et oil un nouvel ambassadeur, M. ]iirgen Eick, anion porte-parole adjoint de M. Willy Brandt, venait precisement do rojoindro son posts le 1?' avail Appeal by the Mayor Across the wall on West Ber- lin's Square of the Republic, .Mayor Klaus Schiltz called onl the Soviet Union, and East ,Germany to enter 'into an earnest dialojue with the West about the. city s future. "Let us get away from the 'cramped immobility of the past and strive. for peaceful co. existence," he said.: ? He spoke to a ? crowd . of ated by the equipment on dis- play, which included - missiles, tanks and artillery pieces,t' the commandants charged. The 30-minute parade was led by cadets from military academics who marched past a grandstand to salute Walter Ulbricht, the East German lead- er; Marshal Pyotr K. Koshevoi, the commander of Soviet forces in East Germany, and other Alllemagne ' de I Ouest La reconnaissance de Berlin-Est par le Cambodge pose le problerne de Ia validite de Ia (De nitre correspond7,.;pcarticulier.) fait en 1957 avec la Yougoslavie et en 1963 avec Cuba ? Depuis, Ia riitiiant~ will have az $p-=c;al taus for village offi.' dials accord'ngto which, th"y will-b4 assigned 18 command` Popular Force, and Ravolutionay? Daveloprn-nt cadres as Well as entitled to use special funds. VIETNAM GUARDIAN 29 March 1969 Thieu's readiness to talk SAIGON (VNG).- A govorti- nient spokesusau said Friday President Nguyen van Thieu's statement to the foreign press earlier this week in which he stated this government is ready to hold secret Talks a ith the National Liber,tiou Front, has been misluterprete:d by certaia elements of the Vietnamese' language press. is "good will escalation" These reports interpreted the President's statement as a change of p thee.. This is an inaccurate con. clusion, the spokesman said. He said that it car4nt read. ing of the President's pre. vious arid most . recant statemen's would reveal that 'there has been no change In positis.ns. We still do not recognize, the NLF as a legal entity,nor 'rill we aceep' any coali'ton? with the comtnunistss, the spokesman said. aWc will not accept the communist Party in S euth Vietuam.a iTha object of the Presi- dent's statement,D he said, was to cese plate th good Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-O'l1Iq4Aoft510 'f 190001-0 WASHINGTON POST Applovvd F)09 Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 By David Hoffman Washlnston Post Forelen Service SAIGON, March 25-President Thieu declared. today that South Vietnam: was 'ready, to. engage in private peace talks .with Hanoi and the National. Liberation front. He set no preconditions. South Vietnam's willingness to bargain in secret has been conveyed to the Communists but neither Hanoi nor the NLF has thus far re- sponded, Thtou Mid, fie said he expect@ Chet The first private meeting talks to. take place.' Ike de has not been scheduled yet, scribed Paris as the ? most but we are working on It," he 11 added. practical? location. He said Asked whether ? Saigon still that Ky "'very possibly" would: insisted that the Communists negotiate for Saigon. And he meet certain conditions be- raised the possibility. of two- fore the beginning of private, party or three-party talks talks, the 45-year-old chief ex between South Vietnam and ecutive suggested they need the NLF, or representatives not. of Hanoi and the NLF in corns, bination. one could raise' any question, and we' might 'consider any problem that arises. Private talks will help in some' way to bring fruitful results and solve what we ? cannot solve in the. official talks," Thieu said. In an obviously, expansive mood, Thieu answered ques-' tions posed by a score of for- eign journalists invited to In-' dependence Palace by the President's office. Sipping a 'Scotch and soda, Thieu spoke in, English without notes. He read no prepared statement. Saigon's refusal to recognize and deal with the NLF, its rival for eventual political con- trol of South Vietnam, has been a major sticking point In efforts to end the war. The current talks in Paris were "In the private talks,"?Thieu' )said, "we do not consider any' longer two sides, four sides,' four men or the number oft delegations." Thieu declined to identify which diplomats conveyed S,aigop's willingness to negoti- ate secretly to the Commu- nists, nor did he say where such overtures were made., But they understand well we are ready," he said. N0.1 YORIZ TD 'ES 27 .:arch 19 $9 IfflEll SAID TO OPEN AN ELECTION ROLE that the nob o aA that tht e treated a5 t be treated FOR ItLF, MEMBERS an equal in the procedural ar- Reported Ready to Integrate Them Into Political Life as Part of Vietnam Accord SAIGON STUDYING PLANSI President Expected to Take Leadership of an Enlarged Pro-Government Party By TERENCE SMITH Spec%l to She New York Times SAIGON, South Vietnam, March 26 - President Nguyen 'Vat] Thleu Is reliably reported' to be ready to Integrate mem ?bers of the National Liberation Front Into the political life of South Vietnam as part of an over-all peace settlement. The president In known to `have, discussed with his ad- visers In recent weeks possible ways In which members of the, .N.L.F. might be permitted to ,compete in elections as mem ambers of- an opposition. 1 In anticipation of a future ';political struggle against the ;Front, Mr. Thicu is also plan- ning to assume personal control, [of an expanded Government ,party. During April, according to sources close to Mr. Thieu, the, President will accept the per-) ' . sonal leadership of an enlarged version of the Peoples Alliance for Social Revolution, a pro- 'Government political organiza- j'tion formed last year. ? Convention Expected An extraordinary convention .of the alliance is expected to jbc held in Saigon during the' month to select Mr. Thieu as 'chairman of its presidium. Additional South Vietnamese political factions are also ex- pected to be accepted into the alliance In an effort to broaden, the base of the Government. Mr. Thicu's closest advisers) have been urging him for sev- :era) months to take a personal] initiative in creating a political' organization that could com- pete with the Front. They-acrd Mr. Thieu--are working on the assumption that some form of political par- ticipation by the Front in South; Vietnam will be part of a peace settlement negotiated in Paris. Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 rangements. Hanoi and the NLF, likewise, do not reco- gnize the Thieu government as the. legitimate government of South Vietnam. South Vietnam's original position was that it would talk only, with Hanoi and the orig- inal Communist position was; that the NLF would talk onlyi with the United States. On Jan. 27, Vice Presidents Ky had said in Paris that; South Vietnam was prepared! for ""private talks with tho' ether Ado if thry arc willing, " but that the time was not ripe for such contacts to' begin,' Today, Thieu was far more specific. THE SAIGCAred For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000500100001-0 8 April 1969 Cites 6 Conditions To End War By Nguyen Duy Lieu President Nguyen Van Thieu said Monday he will ((volunteer) to lad what- he called a political association) and set forth six a basic)) conditions ato end the war in this part of the world,) In a one-hour address before a joint session of the National Assembly, President Thieu said that since his suggestions for strong political parties have not been heeded, he felt it his duty to do the job himself. lie said his political Six Points (4) As the RVN adopts a group will represent ccthe ru- President Titieu said in Knatioual reconcialintion ling tendency, ((calling on tho-, his constant quest for cca policy, those who now are Constructive solution) to the '' fighting against the South, se ,,.?ho share his views and war, the following six poin's but decide to :enounce responsibility to join and help :constitute a cwcasonahle and violence and respect the Ksave riot a solid basis for tho restora- laws of the Renc'blie faith- Tlticu did not elaborate on tion of peace in Vietnam: fully abide by i,'.: 1ecuc:ratic his party and when it would (1) Communist aggression processes, will be welcome 1 be organized formally, 'net' boning only that Kii would should end. In this case Citm- as KfuIh mt:mhers of the be a tightly knit organiza- monist North Vietnam :;Could national coruuu;iity. They large-scale group. give up all its attempts to will enjoy fui! ' iitical rights lion, KMy and only a largeon,l, i said, take over the Republic of and assume t : c,r3nu obtii;a- Vietnam through force. It !inns as other lawful citizens- ((is to help ottrcountry over- difficulties and, should stop violating Ittc ;.) The reunification of come present Demilitarized Zone and the u . two Vielnaots will be de- to (10 whatever is possible RV. frontiers, and end its d by free choice of the. to prevent its loss to the wanton spellings on the inno- people of Vietnam Cote called cent people in the South). through democratic proceses. He called on those who (2) Communist North Viet- 'fltlctt, said that to create disagree with him on the damese troops anti their auxi- an atmosphere conductive to ((procedures and ntethods)o liarv forces and cadres must. national rcunit?icatiou after (of forming such a party) to cotnplctly) withdraw from peace is restored, economic set up their own party which the South. As the military and cultural cx hanges be-- Would then be called an and subversive forces of tween the North a,td South of opposition party Connntutist North Victnatn Vit?tnann' and other conniries Of course the same"nations- polluut, infiltration ceases in the Region (wac, be list ideology must prevail in and the level of violence actively explored, all ogot her any such opposition party,) thus subs;des, the RVN will with other interutediary Thieu said, emphasizing that ask its allies to remove their measures of peaceful coeXis- like any political setup worthy forces, in accordance with te:ice. This, he added, roust of such a uame”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp79-01194a000500100001-0: PROPAGANDA GUIDELINES
Synopsis
“Approved For Release 2001/11/21 : CIA-RDP80-0081 OA001100750002-5 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT This Document contains information affecting the Na- tional Defense of the United ^tatu, within the mean. ini of Title 18, Sections 70.7 and 704, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its trans lesion or revelation of its oontenps to or receipt by an unauthorised person is prohibited by law, The reproduction of this fopm is prohibited. SWIM IICUrnTY INFORMATION COUNTRY Czechoslovakia, SUBJECT Governmental Reorganization SATE OF INFO, 25X1 C PLACE ACQUIRED REPORT NO. DATE DISTR. NO. OF PAGES REQUIREMENT NO. REFERENCES 25X1A 6 August 1953 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A 3. ThS I ieter "of Food 'I`ndustrryy in the spring of 1952 was tudmil.a JANl OVCOVA, former Social Democrat. The Minister of Agrioultural"Supplies.at that time was Josef-!R MAR, a Communist. ,cMinisteretvo Prtiunyelu), the Ministry of '?06d Industry (Minieteretvo Vzivy), Pd the Ministry of Agriculture tMinieterotvo Zemedeletyi). In the middle of the year, a reshuffling of the m,nietry responsibilities occurred, resulting in the liquidation of ~,~,a Miniitrr..,. of Food l'ndustry. This ministry had been located at Prague, II, Lrakoveka uliose Twolnewministries were established to take its place, viz., the Ministry of Food T iduetry (IIIinisteretvo Potravinarskiho 'Prumyslu) located at Cukerni Palec, V1avl1.ckovo Na!Seetj , and the Ministry of Agrioultur$l. Supplies (Ministerstvo 9kuplz) located at aclaveke Nameeti, No. $3. there were only three economically important ministries in c s ova at the beginning of .Q'7 Th s ese e th 25X1X Approved For Release 2001/11/21 : CIA-RDP80-00810A001100750002-5 SECRET/SECURITY INFORMATION The Ministry of Agriculture remained-the sane, except for the; lose of its food procurement responsibility which was transformed into the new Ministry of 4g.%' .e air: r al ,~. law Julius DHRIS was` Minister of Agriculture until early 1952 when he became Commissar (Pawerenik) for Agriculture in Slovakia. he Commissar for Agriculture In Slovakia is the chief administrative officer for agricultural,,. affairs, in Slovakia and is responsible only to the Prime Minister of.Czecbes levakia,, not to the Minister of Agriculture The Slovak Commissar for Agriculture thus has extraordinary power. Other Commissars in. Slovakia are responsible to their respective ministers in Prague. These Commissars are essentially vice-ministers, and carry out the wishes of the ministers The Minister of Agriculture in May 1952 vas J 3*f NEPOMUCKY, a Comunist, who, from 19:46 to 1952, had been. chaiac an of the Agricultural Council in Moravia. During the same period (middle of 1951), the Ministry of Industry underwent a reorganization which caused it to be split into three ministries, viz., the Ministry of Light Industry, the Ministry of Heavy Industry? and the Ministry of Mines and Foundries. The Ministry of Light industry (Ministerstvo Lehkeho Prumyslu) had offices in Prague II, N a Poriei. 5X1A The building was located between the Masaryk Station and the Denis Station, and across the street from a firm known as Hila Labut (White Swan). The Ministry administered industrial organizations which produced goods from leather, glass, textiles, rubber, ceramics, and synthetics. The Ministry of Heavy industry (Ministerstvo Tezkeho Prumysl retained as its own the offices of the former Ministry of Indastr7 at Prague II, Na Frantisku 2. The Ministry administered plants engaged in the production ' of machinry, which was classified as lights;. medium,, and heavy. Light machinery included compressors, small electric motors and turbines, fans, and ventilators. Medium machinery; included -conveying machines, elevators, electro -technical apparatus, lathes, and other machine tools. Heavy machinery included chemical production equipment, steam turbines, diesel motors, steam boilers and other steam machinery, heavy electric equipment, such as dynamos, electric wiring, cables and conductors? and mining machinery. 9. The Ministry of Mines and Foundries (Mimisteretvo Dolu a Hutnibo 1A Pr y slu had offices at Prague XII, Slezeka ulice. n The building was between Koruni trida and a n va- r? . a. n V 5 1 wines, and the production of metals from ores. 10. The Minister of Industry in 1950 was Gustav KLIMENT, who became. Minister of Heavy Industry at the time of the reshuffling. May or dune 1952, KLIMENT was made Chairman of the Central Trade Union Council (IIstredni RAda Odboru -- URO), which held its meetings at Prague I, NaPerstine 8. KLIMENT'a successor as Minister of Heavy Industry was JiCi'Ima MAURER, a Communist, who had no technical qualifications. SECRET Approved For Release 2001/11/21 : CIA-RDP80-00810A001100750002-5”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp80-00810a001100750002-5: GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION
Synopsis
“CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY r - _ ? C'~~.-:1:..-I /N--.. A.-.---.- -I X-- P9-1---- /ll\A 11/!1(]/A !1 . /''I A P, r-,r nn-rl111/l A!-1A llrllff llllrllllllll A /) This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Nspionage Laws, Title 18. U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthor'- c nv B u r i n?rohlbited by law. COUNTRY East Germany Soviet Military Camp DATE DISTR. at Warneinlnde $ Q SEP NO. PAGES REFERENCES RD DATE OF INFO. PLACE & DATE ACQ. report 50X1-HUM a ov a military camp at Warnemilnde. The cam 19 lomted kilometers northeast of the Warnow River. Bunk), an antennnna3with a camouflaged base, three wooden barracks, round and,equwe chimneys stone barracks, ands a radar antenna mast are all located near the 50X1-HUM photographs. -- a man S-E-C-R-E-T IARMY NAVY IR BI EC (Ne18i W~Bagba di:l-ibutioe indketed by'T', Field ditpribution by ..#N.) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP80T00246A050800500001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP80T00246A050800500001-2 Country: East Germany Type of Information: Military/land, air, and naval Subject: Russian military camp at Warneaunde Attachments: 1 sketch of a map of Warnemande. 1 sketch of the camp 1. Location: 3 bi. north-east from the Warnow river, lying to the left and right of the road to Rostocker Heide. Can be reached from Warnem*nde by means of a ferry- boat (See mapy 2. Description of the camp a) to the left of the road at the edge of the dune were observed 2 steel doors, presumably giving entrance to the bunkers built in the dune. The doors are set in a concrete frame. In front of the doors a Russian soldier armed with a rifle. Appriotimately 20 meters beyond the second door a mast of steel con- struction 2opmetirs high. On top an antenna as is shown in the sketch. At the foot of this pole stood something not up, surrounded by a coverin painted in camo'1age colors. It ca of be made out from the shape what lies under the covering. The covering, ressembling fine jute, is approximately 10 z 5 z 5 meters. STAT Close by stood on duty two Russian soldiefa, armed with a rifle. On the site is &: sign saying in German "Strictly forbidden to take photographs". b) to the right of the road just beyond the abovementioned mast, three wooden barracks in which are Russian soldiers as well as women dressed in civilian clothes. At this spot there is a thick forest. Also to the right of the road, approximately 100 meters from the barracks along the road is a three meter high stone wall in the middle of which is an entrance gate. In front of the gate a Russian soldier armed with a gun. By the gate a sign on which is written in Russian, German, and English "Strictly forbidden to take photographs". Above the wall *fferent chimneys both round and square, 50X1-HUM made of stone as we Aas on. These were approximately 5 meters high* various stone barracks as well 50X1 -HU M as about a dozen tankB standing covered with canvas, judging from the shape. r"177 . , ..w, Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP80T00246A050800500001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP80T00246AO50800500001-2 The camp is, except for the side by the road, surrounded by a thick forest. The wall on the side by the road is approximately 200 meters long. Detailed observation is only possible through the entrance gate. Behind the camp a single antenna like the previously mentioned sticks out just above the trees. Q - tree 1. 2. 3. 41 5. 6. 7- 8. edge of dune two bunker doors camoflaged covering radar antenna mast three barracks radar antenna mast three-meter-high stone wall with entrance gate Warnem e -Rosto1bker Heide road. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP80T00246AO50800500001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP80T00246AO50800500001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP80T00246AO50800500001-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP80T00246AO50800500001-2 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP80T00246AO50800500001-2”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp80t00246a050800500001-2: SOVIET MILITARY CAMP AT WARNEMUNDE
Synopsis
“Approved For Rose 1999/09/01 : CIA-RDP78-05 7A000400020029-0 NIS COMMITTEE MEETII NO. 73 27 iuue 1950 The following were presents' Dr. Appleton Mr. Fletcher Mr. Clinton Lt. Col. Kiel Dr. Dsbevoise Cdr. Sowell Lt. Cdr. Nutt Lt. Col. Wade 25X1A9a state state state AM ArW Navy Navy BECLAdcro s :L DOCUMFENT NO. NO CHANCE IIN CL,ksS CLASS, Ct '. ,..._ b n': T;: S C NEXT O. ,` ~: - --__ RUTH: tt+i 1:;-2 DASE6NQ 198 I>:Wifti_018645 Air For" CIA CIA CIA (Chairman) 2, it was explained that personnel not meters of OlE, G-2, ONI, and Direc- torate of Intelligence, USAF, require clearance by the Inspection and, Security Staff ( I & SS)9 CIA, before being permitted to do business in CIA. This means that members of departmental components other than the Intelligence agencies themselves must receive clearance from I & SS before visiting D/NIS for working.- level conferences or for attendance at NIS Committee meetings. D/NIS has compiled a list of each personnel already known and will submit it to I & SS with a request for continuing clearance of the personnel shown thereon. Agency members were requested to submit additional lists, each for his own department. D/~TIS will then prepare a supplement list of personnel. and submit it to I & $ for continuing clearance of the persons shown thereon. Should it be desired that visits be made to CIA by persons otter than those who have received con- tinuing clearance, NIS Committee members should, as far in advance of the desired date of visit as practicable, request D/NIS to obtain the necessary clearance. 3. The ?Updard Instructions for the Special NI5 on Marine Climate and Oceanograpk7 were formally approved. 44. Agency requirements for copies of a.list of NIS elements published or in process of publication as of 30 June 1950 were annouoed as followss AGENC! am OF COPIgS State SS AnW 10 Navy 25 Air Force 35 Approved For Release 1999/09/01 : CIA-RDP78-05597A000400020029-0 Approved For Rte se 1999/09/01 : CIA-RDP78-0J7A000400020029-0 5, The Chairman reported on the present situation respecting Chapter VII (Scientific). The Assistant Director and key personnel of OSI have shown enthusiastic interest in Chapter VII amd have received from members of D/NIS in several conferences indoctrination in the EIS Program in general and Chapter VII in particular. 051 will accept responsibility for preparation of Sections 70 (Introductionand 73 (Atomic Energy) and furnish such support as practicable for preparation of the other sections. At a meeting of the ISIS Chapter VII Committee on 22 dune 1950, the following decisions were taken: ti a. In thirty days, the Chapter VII section subcommittees are to report to the MS Chapter VII Committee on the followings (1) Needed revisions of the Chapter VII outline and outline guide (2) Nev information available for revision of already published Chapter VII of MIS 26 (USSR) and the nature of any such revision to be undertaken (3) A list of countries of significance in the field of scientific research and development and indication of the order of importance of such countries b. Effort is to be made to make membership of the Chapter VII notion subcommittees as nearly as practicable the some as that of the corresponding subcommittees of the Scientific Intelligence committee, 6. There were distributed to the members copies of proposed drafts of a memoranduoc of the Director of Central Intelligence to the Secretary,, Joint Chiefs &I" sting that the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the preparation -of 25X6A by FECOM and of a suggested directive to IECOM. Members were requested to std these drafts and come prepared to discuss them at the next meeting. It was pointed out that the current situation in FECOM may be such as to render it inadvisable to implement this action at this time.. 7. The Chairman stated that some criticism has been received regarding published NIS that the dates shown on the material too greatly precede the dates of publication. In many instances this has been occasioned by the fact that D/NIS has returned material to contributors for correction and the contributors have retained the material for an undue length of time and than returned it to D/MS without bringing the contributions up to date. The consensus was that when D/NIS returns a contribution for extensive revision, Approved For Release 7A000400020029-0 Approved For Release 1999/09/01 : CIA-RDP78-O 7A000400020029-0 the contribution should be resebsdu]ad and redor and the date lips should be ehangad apl pr1-te],y, 8. The next m3eting was sobsduled for 1000 bars, Tu+ear, 31 July 1950, at cue 25X1A9a Distribution: NIS Comm. Members (4) Secre ,_ JIG AD/OFS 1 Chief, _ D (1) D/leis (4) .. 3 Approved For Release 199 7A000400020029-0”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp78-05597a000400020029-0: NIS COMMITTEE MEETING NO. 73
Synopsis
“Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/08: CIA-RDP57-00011A001000170110-6 uorry'j or 29 dune, 1.9% r.L -.r:TD T; ~i~a Finance Division , Accounts Branch Richard 4. ii3sei1, Jr. 12-15 Feeb - I .56 L It is requested that subject - WI 144.1 accountb be credited in the mount of The difference between this clam-I a-u3 the related advance of OO.O0 dr n n on 13 Febmarr 14?56 has bec!n liquidated .~ by a refund of ~.. , (See Receipt P o, dated - - ---- PS Jtwro_ 1T5!_ __ -o M..r..._... 2. For your protection in taking this action, I certify that there is in the custody of the i'roject Comptroller a sufficient voucher which is con- sistent with Agency regulations, approved by an appropriate approri. authority and certified by an authorized certifying officer in the mount of ? 3 This expense is properly chargeable as follows: OBLIGATIO I OBJ LCT T`rAV_L O1Di-2 110. ALLOTT' T' SYTYBOL RE W. NO. CLASS /0C11FrO3...i'.56.. 6.2004-404 a $751 0201 A;?OUNT 3. The Security Office has requested that this voucher not be released through normal administrative channels, Distribution: OFil - Addressee 3 - Voucher file it - Prof. Pers. file - Chrono Authorized CertiWng Officer Project Comptroller Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/08: CIA-RDP57-00011AO01000170110-6”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp57-00011a001000170110-6: RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR. - TRAVEL CLAIM FOR PERIOD 12-15 FEBRUARY 1956
Synopsis
“Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 91sT CONGRESS 2D SESSION I-I . R. 15628 IN TIIE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MAY 11, 1970 Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed AMENDMENT Intended to be proposed by Mr. MUSKIE (for himself, Mr. AN- DERSON, Mr. CANNON, Mr. GRAVEL, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. PACKWOOD, Mr. PEARSON, Mr. PERCY, Mr. SCOTT, and Mr. 'WILLIAMS of New Jersey) to I1.II. 15628, an Act to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act, viz : On page 4, after line 17, add the following new section : 1 SEC. 7. (a) The success of a land reform program in 2 Vietnam is a material factor in the future political and eco- 3 nomic stability of that nation, and the speed with which such 4 a program is given effect may have consequences with re- 5 Bard to the termination of hostilities there. 6 (b) The President is authorized to use funds appro- Amdt. No. 621 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 2 iriaated pursuant to this section to encourage and support, the rapid itnpletttentaation of the national land reform program onateted in la.relt 1970 by the Government of South Viet- tarn. The use of stivii funds for land reform in Vietnam shall .te contingent upon the atttatiiniwnt of mutually agreed goals of accomplishment stressing econonir, efficiency, and ad- vanced implemefflattion of the program by July 1, 1972. Trarlehc s for land reform aassist~anee to the Government of Vietnam shall be made at quarterly intervals based upon satisfactory achievement toward the 1972 target goal. (c) (Grants nt:tt? also be ]mice. out of Rinds appropriated Imrsctaitt. to this section, for the 1)11 re( arse amid sltil-utcttt to V'ietnattu of goods and commodities. matnufatct.tired or pro- duced in the United States, which, by their introduction into the Vietnamese economy, will contribute to sound economic development in Vietnam. Such goods and commodities (1) shall be of a type approved by the President for such pro- grams; (2) shall include goods suitable for agricultural sttp- plies, business inventories in nonluxttry interprises, and c:atPi- tal goods for cToctonlie development; and (3) may be exchanged for boards issued by the Government of Vietnam to compensate landowners chose lands are transferred to other persons tinder such programs, or used in such other 21 wat,v is the Government of Vietnam may determine, consist- ent With the purposes of this section, Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 1 (d) In order to carry out the provisions of this section, 2 there are authorized to be appropriated $200,000,000 in 3 fiscal year 1971. Funds appropriated under this section are 4 authorized to remain available until expended. Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 Amdt. No. 621 91~Q H. R. 1 628 Szomm Intended to be proposed by Mr. Mvsgne (for himself, Mr. A.'4 zPso'.-T, Mr. CANNON, Mr. GRAM,, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. M&o msoN, Mr. PAcKwoon, Mr. PEASaoN, If r. PrBcT, Mr. Scorr, and Mr. WxY u-vm of New Jersey) to H.R.15628, an Act to amend the Foreign Military Sales Act. MAY 11,1970 Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000400080006-1 AMENDMENT”
CIA Reading Room cia-rdp72-00337r000400080006-1: H.R. 15628